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Abstract
We study communication in the presence of a jamming adversary where quadratic power constraints are imposed on the
transmitter and the jammer. The jamming signal is allowed to be a function of the codebook, and a noncausal but noisy observation
of the transmitted codeword. For a certain range of the noise-to-signal ratios (NSRs) of the transmitter and the jammer, we are
able to characterize the capacity of this channel under deterministic encoding. For the remaining NSR regimes, we determine the
capacity under the assumption of a small amount of common randomness (at most Oplogpnqq bits in one sub-regime, and at most
Opn1`q bits for any  ą 0 in the other sub-regime) available to the encoder-decoder pair. Our proof techniques involve a novel
myopic list-decoding result for achievability and a Plotkin-type push attack for the converse in a subregion of the NSRs, which
may be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRIOR WORK
Consider a point-to-point communication system where a transmitter, Alice, wants to send a message to a receiver, Bob,
through a channel distorted by additive noise. She does so by encoding the message to a length-n codeword, which is fed into
the channel. The transmitted codeword is distorted by noise. Much of traditional communication and information theory has
focused on the scenario where the noise is independent of the transmitted signal and the coding scheme. We study the case
where communication takes place in the presence of a malicious jammer (whom we call James) who tries to ensure that Bob is
unable to recover the transmitted message. The channel is a discrete-time, real-alphabet channel, and the codeword transmitted
by Alice is required to satisfy a quadratic power constraint. It is assumed that the coding scheme is known to all three parties,
and James also observes a noisy version of the transmitted signal (hence the term myopic). The jamming signal is required to
satisfy a separate power constraint, but otherwise can be a noncausal function of the noisy observation and the coding scheme.
This problem is part of the general framework of arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), introduced by Blackwell et al. [2]. The
quadratically constrained AVC (also called the Gaussian AVC) was studied by Blachman [3], who gave upper and lower bounds
on the capacity of the channel under the assumption that James observes a noiseless version of the transmitted codeword (a.k.a.
the omniscient adversary). The lower bound used a sphere packing argument similar to the one used to prove the Gilbert-
Varshamov (GV) bound for binary linear codes. The upper bound was based on Rankin’s upper bound on the number of
non-intersecting spherical caps that can be placed on a sphere [4]. The quadratically constrained AVC is closely related to
the sphere-packing problem where the objective is to find the densest arrangement of identical n-dimensional balls of radius?
nN subject to the constraint that the center of each ball lies within a ball of radius
?
nP . An exact characterization of the
capacity of this problem is not known, though inner [3] and outer bounds [5], [6] are known. At the other end of the spectrum,
Hughes and Narayan [7], and later Csisza´r and Narayan [8], studied the problem with an “oblivious” James, who knows the
codebook, but does not see the transmitted codeword. They showed that if private randomness is available at the encoder, the
capacity of the oblivious adversarial channel is equal to that of an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel (where the
noise variance is equal to the power constraint imposed on James). The capacity exhibits a phase transition: The capacity is
equal to that of the corresponding AWGN channel for N ă P , but is zero for N ě P . These omniscient and oblivious cases
are two extreme instances of the general myopic adversary that we study in this paper.
The oblivious vector Gaussian AVC was studied by Hughes and Narayan [9], and later Thomas and Hughes [10] derived
bounds on the error exponents for the oblivious Gaussian AVC. Sarwate and Gastpar [11] showed that the randomized coding
capacity of the oblivious channel is the same under average and maximum error probability constraints.
The work closest to that in this paper is by Sarwate [12], who characterized the capacity of this channel under the assumption
that James knows a noisy version of the transmitted signal, but Alice’s codebook is shared only with Bob. This can be interpreted
as a myopic channel with an unlimited amount of common randomness (or shared secret key, CR) between Alice and Bob. A
related model was studied by Haddadpour et al. [13], who assumed that James knows the message, but not the exact codeword
1This work was partially funded by a grant from the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project No. AoE/E-
02/08) and RGC GRF grants 14208315 and 14313116. This work was done when Shashank Vatedka was at the department of Information Engineering,
Chinese University of Hong Kong. The work of Shashank Vatedka was supported in part by CUHK Direct Grants 4055039 and 4055077.
This work was presented in part at the 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information theory, Vail, CO, USA [1].
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2Fig. 1: The setup studied in this paper.
transmitted by Alice. In this setup, Alice has access to private randomness which is crucially used to pick a codeword for
a given message. However, Alice and Bob do not share any common randomness. Game-theoretic versions of the problems
have also been considered in the literature, notably by Me´dard [14], Shafiee and Ulukus [15] and Baker and Chao [16].
Shafiee and Ulukus [15] considered a more general two-sender scenario, while Baker and Chao [16] studied a multiple antenna
version of the problem. More recently, Hosseinigoki and Kosut [17] derived the list-decoding capacity of the Gaussian AVC
with an oblivious adversary. Zhang and Vatedka [18] derived bounds on achievable list-sizes for random spherical and lattice
codes. Pereg and Steinberg [19] have analyzed a relay channel where the observation of the destination is corrupted by a
power-constrained oblivious adversary.
Communication in the presence of a myopic jammer has also received considerable attention in the discrete-alphabet case
(see [20] and references therein, and the recent [21], [22] on covert communication with myopic jammers). We would like
to draw connections to the bit-flip adversarial problem where communication takes place over a binary channel, and James
observes the codeword through a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability q. He is allowed to flip at most
np bits, where 0 ă p ă 1{2 can be interpreted as his “jamming power.” Dey et al. [20] showed that when James is sufficiently
myopic, i.e., q ą p, the capacity is equal to 1´Hppq. In other words, he can do no more damage than an oblivious adversary.
As we will see in the present article, this is not true for the quadratically constrained case. We will show that as long as the
omniscient list-decoding capacity for Bob is greater than the AWGN channel capacity for James, the capacity is equal to a
certain myopic list-decoding capacity for Bob.
Let us formally describe the problem. The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice wants to send a message m to Bob. The
message is assumed to be uniformly chosen from t0, 1unR, where R ą 0 is a parameter called the rate. Alice and Bob
additionally have nkey bits of shared secret key, k (nkey could be zero). This key is kept private from James. Alice encodes
the message m (using k) to a codeword x P Rn, which is transmitted across the channel. Let C denote the set of all possible
codewords (the codebook). Due to potential randomness at the encoder either privately known only to the encoder (stochastic
encoding) or shared secretly with the decoder (randomized encoding), the codebook rate Rcode – 1n log |C| could be different
from the message rate R (which we sometimes simply refer to as the rate). The codebook must satisfy a power constraint of
P ą 0, i.e. }x}2 ď
?
nP for all x P C. James sees z “ x ` sz , where sz is an AWGN with mean zero and variance σ2. He
chooses a jamming vector s P Rn as a noncausal function of z, the codebook C, and his private randomness. The jamming
vector is also subject to a power constraint: }s}2 ď
?
nN for some N ą 0. Bob obtains y “ x ` s, and decodes this to
a message pm. The message is said to have been conveyed reliably if pm “ m. The probability of error, Pe, is defined as
the probability that pm ‰ m, where the randomness is over the message m, the random noise sz , the key k, and the private
random bits available to James. In all our code constructions1, we will assume that Alice and Bob may share a secret key,
but the mapping from pm,kq to x is deterministic. In other words, Alice does not possess any source of additional private
randomness. Conversely, all our impossibility results are robust to the presence of private randomness at the encoder (since in
some AVC scenarios, private randomness is known to boost capacity — e.g. [23]) We will study the problem with different
amounts of common randomness shared by Alice and Bob but unknown to James, and present results in each case.
1An exception is Appendix B, where we show that private randomness does not increase the capacity of the omniscient adversarial channel. However, we
have reason to believe (albeit unsupported by formal proof) that additional private randomness may increase the achievable rate — this is part of our ongoing
investigation.
3Fig. 2: Capacity of the myopic adversarial channel for nkey “ 8 [12]. The x-axis denotes the NSR from Alice to Bob (with
noise from James) and the y-axis denotes NSR from Alice to James (with AWGN added).
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Achievable rates for myopic list-decoding for (a) nkey “ 0 and (b) nkey “ 0.2n bits of common randomness.
We say that a rate R ą 0 is achievable if there exists a sequence (in increasing n) of codebooks for which the probability
of error goes to zero as nÑ8. The supremum of all achievable rates is called the capacity of the channel.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
We give a summary of our results and proof techniques in Sec. III. These are also compactly summarized in Table I. Notation
and preliminaries are described in Sec. VI. This is followed by a formal description of results. In Sec. VIII, we describe Sarwate’s
results for infinite common randomness and give a formal proof of the converse. Sec. IX contains our results with linear and
logarithmic amounts of common randomness with Lemmas IX.7 and IX.8 summarizing the results. Our results on list-decoding
are described in Sec. IX-A, with Theorem X.1 giving the main result. Results with deterministic encoding are presented in
Sec. X. Sec. XI contains a detailed proof of Theorem IX.5, and Sec. XII gives the proof of Theorem X.1. Appendix B has a
note on why private randomness does not improve the capacity if James is omniscient. Some of the technical details of proofs
appear in the other appendices. Frequently used notation is summarized in Table II. Fig. 25 is a flow-chart outlining the proof.
III. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS AND PROOF TECHNIQUES
A. Results
We now briefly describe our results and proof techniques. It is helpful to visualize our results using a N{P versus σ2{P
plot similar to the one shown in Fig. 2. Sarwate [12] showed that with an infinite amount of common randomness, the capacity
4Region where
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Fig. 4: Capacity with nkey “ 0.2n. We have a complete characterization in the solid regions but nonmatching upper and lower
bounds in the dotted regions.
is RLD – 12 log
P
N in the red region, and RLD,myop –
1
2 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qpP`Nq´2P
?
NpP`σ2q
Nσ2
˙
in the blue region2. The capacity
is zero in the grey region.
In this article, we derive results for three different regimes of common randomness: (1) nkey “ Θpnq, (2) nkey “ Θplog nq,
and (3) nkey “ 0.
‚ We prove a general result for list-decoding in the presence of a myopic adversary. For an omniscient adversary, the list-
decoding capacity is RLD “ 12 log PN . This is a folklore result, but we give a proof of this statement in Appendix C for
completeness. When the adversary is myopic, and the encoder-decoder pair shares Opnq bits of common randomness, we
give achievable rates for list-decoding. This is equal to RLD for σ
2
P ď PN ´ 1, and is larger than RLD in a certain regime
(depending on the amount of common randomness) where σ
2
P ą PN ´ 1. The achievable rates are illustrated in Fig. 3.
With no common randomness, we can achieve RLD and RLD,myop in the red and blue regions of Fig. 3a respectively.
If Alice and Bob share nkey bits, then RLD,myop is achievable in a larger region. For instance, if nkey “ 0.2n, then the
blue region can be expanded to give Fig. 3b.
‚ When common randomness is present, we combine our list-decoding result with [24, Lemma 13] to give achievable rates
for reliable communication over the myopic adversarial channel. Let us first discuss the case the amount of common
randomness is linear in n, i.e., nkey “ nRkey for some Rkey ą 0. If Rkey ě 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘´RLD,myop, then we are able
to give a complete characterization of the capacity of the channel for all values of the NSRs. We can achieve everything
in Fig. 2. If Rkey ă 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘´RLD,myop, then we are able to characterize the capacity in only a sub-region of the
NSRs. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 for different values of Rkey. In the dotted regions, we only have nonmatching
upper and lower bounds. It is worth pointing out that no fixed Rkey will let us achieve RLD,myop in the entire blue region
of Fig. 2. However, for every point in the blue region, there exists a finite value of Rkey such that RLD,myop is achievable
at that point. In other words, an nkey “ Opnq is sufficient to achieve RLD,myop at every point in the interior of the blue
region in Fig. 2.
2The authors would like to take this opportunity to point out an error in [12], in which it was claimed (without proof) that the capacity even with an infinite
amount of common randomness equals zero when N{P ą 1. This is incorrect.
5Fig. 5: Capacity with nkey “ n.
‚ For the nkey “ Θplog nq case, we are able to find the capacity in the red and blue regions in Fig. 6. In the dotted regions,
we have nonmatching upper and lower bounds.
‚ For nkey “ 0, we require a more involved approach to find the capacity. We use some of the results on myopic list-
decoding in our bounds for the probability of error. We find the capacity in the red, blue and grey regions in Fig. 7, but
only have nonmatching upper and lower bounds in the dotted green and white regions.
‚ We show that if James is omniscient, then private randomness at the encoder does not help improve the capacity. This is
based on a similar observation made by Dey et al. [23] for the bit-flip adversarial channel. See Appendix B for details.
The variation of the regions of the noise-to-signal ratios (NSR) where we can obtain achievable rates is illustrated in Fig. 8. As
seen in the figure, even Θplog nq bits of common randomness is sufficient to ensure that the red and blue regions are expanded.
An additional Θpnq bits can be used to expand the blue region even further, eventually achieving everything in Fig. 2. The
rates derived in this paper are compared with prior work in Table I.3
B. Proof techniques for converse results
We begin by outlining the proof techniques used in our converse results as they are easier to describe.
1) Scale-and-babble: The scale-and-babble attack is a strategy that reduces the channel from Alice to Bob into an AWGN
channel. James expends a certain amount of power in cancelling the transmitted signal, and the rest in adding independent
Gaussian noise. Since the capacity of the AWGN channel cannot be increased using common randomness, the scale-and-babble
attack gives an upper bound that is valid for all values of nkey. This technique gives us the rate region illustrated in Fig. 9.
The capacity is upper bounded by RLD in the red region, RLD,myop in the blue region, and is zero in the grey region.
We would like to remark that the scale-and-babble attack is not an original idea of this work. This proof was suggested by
Sarwate [12], and is an application of a more general technique proposed by Csisza´r and Narayan [25] to convert an AVC into
a discrete memoryless channel. Nevertheless we give a complete proof to keep the paper self-contained.
3Many prior works (for example Me´dard, Sarwate, etc) also consider additional random noise on the channel from Alice to Bob. In principle the techniques
in this paper carry over directly even to that setting, but for ease of exposition we choose not to present those results.
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Fig. 6: Capacity with nkey “ Θplog nq.
2) Symmetrization attacks: Symmetrization attacks give us upper bounds on the throughput when Alice and Bob do not
share a secret key. We give two attacks for James: a z-aware symmetrization attack and a z-agnostic symmetrization attack.
In the z-aware symmetrization attack, James picks a codeword x1 from Alice’s codebook uniformly at random and inde-
pendently of z. He transmits px1 ´ zq{2 — since z “ x ` sz for some vector sz with N p0, σ2q components, therefore Bob
receives px ` x1 ´ szq{2. If x ‰ x1, then Bob makes a decoding error with nonvanishing probability. This attack is inspired
by a technique used to prove the Plotkin bound for bit-flip channels. The symmetrization attack lets us prove that the capacity
is zero when σ
2
P ď 4NP ´ 2 (Fig. 10a). The z-aware attack is novel in the context of myopic channels, but is also inspired by
similar ideas in [26].
The z-agnostic symmetrization argument lets us show that the capacity is zero for N ą P (Fig. 10b). James picks a
codeword x1 as before but instead transmits s “ x1. Bob receives x ` x1 and we can show that the probability of error is
nonvanishing. The z-agnostic symmetrization attack was used by Csisza´r and Narayan [8] to show that the capacity of the
oblivious adversarial channel is zero for N ą P .
These symmetrization arguments are not valid when nkey ą 0. Indeed, we will show that strictly positive rates can be
achieved in the symmetrizable regions with even Ωplog nq bits of common randomness. However, the scale-and-babble attack
is resilient to common randomness since it involves reducing the channel into an equivalent AWGN channel, and the capacity
of the AWGN channel cannot be increased using common randomness.
Combining the three techniques give us the upper bounds in Fig. 11.
C. Proof techniques for achievability results
The proofs in the three regimes of nkey outlined above involve some common techniques. We now give a high-level description
of some of the ideas. Fundamental to the achievability proofs is the concept of list-decoding. In all the achievability proofs,
we use random spherical codes C “ txpm, kq : 1 ď m ď 2nR, 1 ď k ď 2nkeyu, where each xpm, kq is sampled independently
and uniformly from the sphere Sn´1p0,?nP q.
1) Myopic list-decoding: This is a central idea in our proofs, and a novel contribution of this work. The broad idea is to use
myopicity to ensure that James is unable to uniquely recover the transmitted codeword. We show that if the codebook rate is
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Fig. 7: Capacity with no common randomness. Here, RGV – 12 log
´
P 2
4NpP´Nq
¯
1tPě2Nu.
Fig. 8: Expansion of the achievable rate regions for the myopic adversarial channel with different amounts of common
randomness. A rate of RLD is achievable in the red and orange regions, whereas RLD,myop is achievable in the regions
with different shades of blue. With Ωpnq bits of common randomness, a rate of at least RLD is achievable whenever P ą N .
8Fig. 9: Upper bounds on capacity as obtained from the scale-and-babble attack. These outer bounds are valid for all values of
nkey.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Regions where the (a) z-agnostic symmetrization argument and (b) z-aware symmetrization argument gives zero
capacity. Note that these are valid only for nkey “ 0. However, they continue to hold even if the encoder has access to private
randomness.
Fig. 11: Upper bounds on capacity for nkey “ 0.
9Fig. 12: Currently, our reverse list-decoding arguments, an integral part of our proof techniques for nkey “ 0, are only valid in
the red and blue regions, which present bottlenecks in our analysis of the scenario when no common randomness is available.
As ongoing work, we are trying to expand the region where reverse list-decoding is possible.
sufficiently large, then there are exponentially many codewords that potentially confuse James. Due to the confusion, no attack
strategy by James is as bad as the one he could instantiate in the omniscient case. We study the list-decoding problem, where
instead of recovering the transmitted message uniquely, Bob tries to output a polypnq sized list that includes the transmitted
codeword. Since James is myopic, we could hope to achieve rates greater than the omniscient list-decoding capacity RLD.
Even with nkey “ 0, we can achieve a higher rate, equal to RLD,myop, in the blue region in Fig. 3a. The blue region can be
expanded with a larger amount of common randomness, as seen in Fig. 3b. We will in fact show that the list-decoding capacity
is equal to Cmyop,rand if nkey is large enough.
Let us briefly outline the proof techniques. We show that conditioned on z, the transmitted codeword lies in a strip
approximately at a distance
?
nσ2 to z. See Fig. 13 for an illustration. If the codebook rate exceeds 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
, then
this strip will contain exponentially many codewords. All these codewords are roughly at the same distance to z and are
therefore nearly indistinguishable from the one actually transmitted. We operate under the assumption of a more powerful
adversary who has, in addition to z, access to an oracle. This is a matter of convenience and will greatly simplify our proofs.
The oracle reveals an exponential sized subset of the codewords (that includes x) from the strip. We call this the oracle-given
set (OGS). We prove that for most codewords in the OGS, no attack vector s can eventually force a list-size greater than
polypnq as long as the rate is less than Cmyop,rand. To prove this result, we obtain a bound on the typical area of the decoding
region Sn´1p0,?nP q X Bnpx ` s,?nNq. We will show that for certain regimes of the noise-to-signal ratios (NSRs), the
volume of the decoding region is typically much less than AreapCapn´1px`s,?nN,?nP qq. This lets us get an improvement
over the omniscient list-decoding capacity.
2) Reverse list-decoding: This is a technique used to obtain achievable rates in the case where Alice and Bob do not
share any common randomness. Given an attack vector s, we say that x1 confuses x if x1 lies within Bnpx ` s,?nNq. In
list-decoding, we attempt to find the number of codewords that could potentially confuse the transmitted codeword. Our goal
in the list-decoding problem is to keep the number of confusable codewords to a minimum. In reverse list-decoding, we ask
the opposite question: Given a potentially confusing codeword, how many codewords in the strip could this confuse?
For every codeword x1 and attack vector s, we could define the reverse list-size as |tx P Str : }x ` s ´ x1}2 ď
?
nNu|.
In other words, this is the number of codewords in the strip which when translated by s, are confusable with x1. Our goal is
to keep this as small as possible (in fact, polypnq) for all possible attack vectors s. We show that small reverse list-sizes are
guaranteed as long as 12 log
P
N ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
, i.e. in the red and blue regions of Fig. 12.
3) Going from list-decoding to unique decoding: Obtaining results for unique decoding uses two different approaches that
depends on the amount of common randomness.
‚ Linear/logarithmic amount of common randomness: Langberg [27] gave a combinatorial technique to convert any list-
decodable code (with no common randomness) for a binary channel into a uniquely decodable code with Ωplog nq bits
of common randomness. This was later generalized by Sarwate [24] to arbitrary AVCs. This combined with our result on
myopic list-decoding will give us an achievable rate for reliable communication over the myopic channel.
‚ No common randomness: The ideas in myopic list-decoding can be used to show that there are at most polypnq codewords
that can potentially confuse the exponentially many codewords in the OGS. Using reverse list-decoding, we can conclude
that each codeword outside the OGS can confuse at most polypnq codewords in the OGS. Using this, and a “grid argument”
along the lines of [20], we can show that the probability of decoding error is vanishingly small.
10
Fig. 13: Illustration of the strip and the oracle-given set (OGS). All codewords in the strip are roughly at the same distance
from z, and hence approximately have the same likelihood of being transmitted. The OGS is a randomly chosen subset of the
codewords in this strip. The OGS is illustrated by the red and green points.
4) Two uses of the common randomness: When Alice and Bob have only Oplog nq bits of common randomness, k is only
used to find the true message from the list using the approach proposed in [27], [24]. However, when Alice and Bob have
Ωpnq bits of shared secret key, there are two different uses for k.
Recall from our discussion above that to obtain an improvement over omniscient list-decoding, we must ensure that James
is sufficiently confused about the true codeword. If he can recover x with high probability (w.h.p.), then there would be
no hope of achieving rates greater than RLD. When Alice and Bob share linear amounts of common randomness, all but a
Oplog nq amount of this is used to ensure that the strip contains exponentially many codewords. This is done by generating
2nkey´Θplognq independent codebooks, each containing 2nR codewords. Based on the realization of the key, Alice picks the
appropriate codebook for encoding. Since Bob knows the key, he can use this codebook for decoding. However, James does
not have access to the shared secret key and to him, all the 2nR`nkey´Θplognq codewords are equally likely to have been
transmitted. This ensures that James is sufficiently confused about the true codeword. The remaining Oplog nq bits are then
used to disambiguate the list at the decoder.
IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER WORKS
We now describe the similarities and differences with three closely related works.
Sarwate [12] derived the capacity of the myopic adversarial channel with unlimited common randomness. Our ideas are
inspired by this work, although the techniques used are different. This is in some sense a continuation of [12], with a restriction
on the amount of shared secret key. In [12], the codebook was privately shared by Alice and Bob. A minimum angle decoder
was used, and the achievable rate was the solution of an optimization problem identical to what we obtain in our analysis of
myopic list-decoding. The converse used the scale-and-babble attack that we describe in a subsequent section. When Alice and
Bob share Ωpnq bits of common randomness, we find that the upper bound is indeed optimal. We were unable to obtain an
improved upper bound for smaller amounts of common randomness. However, we do give an improved converse for certain
NSRs using symmetrization when there is no common randomness shared by the encoder-decoder pair.
Dey et al. [20] studied the discrete myopic adversarial channel. We borrow several proof techniques from their paper to
obtain results when nkey “ 0. This includes the ideas of blob list-decoding, reverse list-decoding, and the grid argument to
prove that the probability of error is vanishingly small even when transmitting at rates above RGV, despite the fact that the
jamming pattern may be correlated with the transmission. However, there are several differences between our work and the
discrete case. A key difference between this work and [20] is our use of myopic list-decoding. A direct extension of the
techniques in [20] would only let us achieve rates up to the omniscient list-decoding capacity 12 log
P
N . The study of myopic
list-decoding is novel, and is one of the main contributions of this work. Furthermore, the random variables involved in this
work are continuous which introduces several challenges. Several arguments involving union bounds and fixed distances do
not go through directly from the discrete setting. We overcome some of these by quantizing the relevant random variables,
a standard trick to reduce the continuous variables to discrete. In [20], the oracle-given set was chosen to be a subset of
codewords all at the same distance to the vector received by James. All codewords in the OGS would then have the same
posterior probability given James’ observation and the OGS. As sz is Gaussian in our case, such an argument cannot be used.
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Reference Rate Level of myopicity Common
random-
ness
Folklore
(Appendix C)
RLD – 12 log
P
N
for list-decoding σ2 “ 0 0
Hughes-
Narayan [7]
Cobli,rand – CAWGN – 12 log
´
1` P
N
¯
σ2 “ 8 8
Csisza´r-
Narayan [8]
Cobli – CAWGN1tPěNu σ2 “ 8 0
Blachman [3] Comni ď RRankin –
1
2
log
´
P
2N
¯
1tPě2Nu σ2 “ 0 0
Comni ě RGV – 12 log
´
P2
4NpP´Nq
¯
1tPě2Nu
Kabatiansky-
Levenshtein [5]
Comni ď RLP – pα logα´ β log βq1tPě2Nu, σ2 “ 0 0
where α– P`2
?
NpP´Nq
4
?
NpP´Nq , β –
P´2?NpP´Nq
4
?
NpP´Nq
Sarwate [12]
Cmyop,rand “ RLD – 12 log PN σ
2
P
ď 1
N{P ´ 1 8
Cmyop,rand “ RLD,myop – 12 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qpP`Nq´2P
?
NpP`σ2q
Nσ2
˙
σ2
P
ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
Cmyop,rand “ 0 σ2P ď NP ´ 1
This work
Cmyop “ RLD 11´N{P ´ 1 ď σ
2
P
ď 1
N{P ´ 1
0
Cmyop “ RLD,myop σ2P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 11´N{P ´ 1
)
RGV ď Cmyop ď RLD 4NP ´ 2 ď σ
2
P
ď min
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 11´N{P ´ 1
)
RGV ď Cmyop ď RLD,myop max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 4NP ´ 2
)
ď σ2
P
ď 1
1´N{P ´1, NP ď 1
Cmyop “ 0 σ2P ď 4NP ´ 2 or NP ě 1
Cmyop “ RLD σ2P ď 1N{P ´ 1
ΘplognqCmyop “ RLD,myop σ2P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 4NP ´ 1
)
RLD ď Cmyop ď RLD,myop max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
ď σ2
P
ď 4N
P
´ 1
Cmyop “ 0 σ2P ď NP ´ 1
Cmyop “ RLD σ2P ď 1N{P ´ 1
nRkeyCmyop “ RLD,myop σ2P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
,
and Rkey ą 12 log
´
1` P
σ2
¯
´RLD,myop
RLD ď Cmyop ď RLD,myop σ2P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
,
and Rkey ă 12 log
´
1` P
σ2
¯
´RLD,myop
Cmyop “ 0 σ2P ď NP ´ 1
TABLE I: Summary of known results for the adversarial channel with quadratic constraints. Here, 1tPěNu is 1 when P ě N
and zero otherwise. Rates known in prior work are plotted in Fig. 14.
Instead, we choose the OGS from a thin strip. Given z and the OGS, the codewords are not uniformly distributed. However,
we carefully choose the thickness of the strip to be small enough to ensure that this posterior distribution is close to being
uniform. Due to the random variables being continuous, dealing with the quadratically constrained case requires a more careful
analysis involving many more slackness parameters than the discrete analog.
The symmetrization argument we use in Section X-2 is inspired by the “scaled babble-and-push” attack studied by Li et
al. [26]. This studies the attack where James generates an independent codeword x1 and transmits px1´zq{2, and lets us prove
that the capacity is zero in the regime where σ2{P ă 4N{P ´ 2.
We could potentially extend this idea, along the lines of the scaled babble-and-push attack [26] in the following manner. In
a subset of codeword indices, James uses the scale-and-babble attack. In the remaining indices i, he transmits px1i´ ziq{2. We
could hope to get an improved converse in the regime 1 ď PN ď 1 ` σ
2
P ď 1N{P´1 . We were unsuccessful in analyzing this
and it has been left as future work.
V. NOTATION
Random variables are denoted by lower case Latin letters in boldface, e.g., m,x, s, etc. Their realizations are denoted by
corresponding letters in plain typeface, e.g., m,x, s, etc. Vectors of length n, where n is the block-length, are denoted by lower
case Latin letters with an underline, e.g., x, s, x, s, etc. The ith entry of a vector is denoted by a subscript i, e.g., xi, si, xi, si,
etc. Matrices are denoted by capital Latin/Greek letters in boldface, e.g., I,Σ, etc.
Sets are denoted by capital Latin letters in calligraphic typeface, e.g., C, I, etc. In particular, an pn´ 1q-dimensional sphere
in n-dimensional Euclidean space centered at x of radius r is denoted by
Sn´1px, rq “ ty P Rn : }y}2 “ ru.
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Fig. 14: Achievable rates for the quadratically constrained adversarial channel — prior work.
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Fig. 15: Capacity of the myopic adversarial channel with Ωpnq bits of common randomness. Here NSRJames – σ2{P .
Fig. 16: Capacity of the myopic adversarial channel with different amounts of common randomness. Here, RNCpnkeyq denotes
the region where our upper and lower bounds do not meet.
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Fig. 17: Capacity of the myopic adversarial channel as a function of σ2{P .
(a) An pn´ 1q-dimensional cap Capn´1px, r, r1q centered
at x of radius r living on an pn´1q-dimensional sphere of
radius r1.
(b) An pn´ 1q-dimensional strip Strn´1px´, x`, r´, r`q
centered at x´ and x` of radii r´ and r`.
Fig. 18: The geometry of caps and strips.
An n-dimensional ball in Euclidean space centered at x of radius r is denoted by
Bnpx, rq “ ty P Rn : }y}2 ď ru.
As shown in Figure 18a, an pn ´ 1q-dimensional cap centered at x of radius r living on an pn ´ 1q-dimensional sphere of
radius r1 is denoted by
Capn´1px, r, r1q “ ty P Sn´1pO, r1q : }y ´ x}2 ď ru
“ Bnpx, rq X Sn´1pO, r1q.
As shown in Figure 18b, an pn´ 1q-dimensional strip centered at x´ and x` of radii r´ and r` is denoted by
Strn´1px´, x`, r´, r`q “tx P Sn´1prq : }x´ x´}2 ě r´, }x´ x`}2 ď r`u
“Bnpx´, r´qc X Bnpx`, r`q X Sn´1pO, rq,
where r satisfies
b
r2 ´ r2´ ´
b
r2 ´ r2` “ |x´x`|. An n-dimensional shell centered at x of inner radius rin and outer radius
rout, where rout ą rin, is denoted by
Shnpx, rin, routq “Shn
ˆ
x,
rin ` rout
2
˘ rout ´ rin
2
˙
“Bnpx, routqzBnpx, rinq.
Let Areap¨q denote the Lebesgue area of an Euclidean surface and let Volp¨q denote the Lebesgue volume of a Euclidean body.
For M P Zą0, we let rM s denote the set of first M positive integers t1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Mu.
The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of a discrete random variable x or a random vector x is denoted by px or px. Here
with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same to denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) of x or x if they are
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continuous. If every entry of x is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to px, then we write x „ pbnx . In
other words,
pxpxq “ pbnx pxq–
nź
i“1
pxpxiq.
Let UpΩq denote the uniform distribution over some probability space Ω. Let N pµ,Σq denote the n-dimensional Gaussian
distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ.
The indicator function is defined as, for any A Ď Ω and x P Ω,
1Apxq “
#
1, x P A
0, x R A .
At times, we will slightly abuse notation by saying that 1A is 1 when relation A is satisfied and zero otherwise. We use
standard Bachmann-Landau (Big-Oh) notation for asymptotic functions. All logarithms are to the base two.
We use Hp¨q to denote interchangeably Shannon entropy and differential entropy; the exact meaning will usually be clear
from context.
VI. PRELIMINARIES
Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC). A channel with a state controlled by an adversarial jammer is called an AVC in the
literature. James’ jamming strategy is a (potentially probabilistic) map which, based on his observation, constructs an attack
vector s satisfying his maximum power constraint }s}2 ď
?
nN ,
Jam : Rn Ñ Rn
z ÞÑ s .
Code. A deterministic encoder is a deterministic map which encodes a message to a codeword of length n, where n is called
block-length or the number of channel uses, satisfying Alice’s maximum power constraint }xpmq}2 ď
?
nP ,
Enc : t0, 1unR Ñ Rn
m ÞÑ xpmq ,
where R is the rate of the system. Alice uses her encoder to encode the set of messages t0, 1unR and get a codebook
txpmqu2nRm“1 which is simply the collection of codewords.
A deterministic decoder is a deterministic function which maps Bob’s observation to a reconstruction of the message,
Dec : Rn Ñ t0, 1unR
y ÞÑ pm .
An pn,R, P,Nq deterministic code C is a deterministic encoder-decoder pair pEnc,Decq. Sometimes we also slightly abuse
the notation and call the set of codewords txpmqu2nRm“1 a code.
We distinguish between three types of codes:
‚ Deterministic codes: The encoder is a deterministic map from t0, 1unR to Rn, and the decoder is a deterministic map
from Rn to t0, 1unR.
‚ Stochastic codes: The encoder and decoder are allowed to use private randomness. If Alice and Bob have nA and nB bits
of private randomness respectively, then a stochastic encoder is a map
Enc : t0, 1unR ˆ t0, 1unA Ñ Rn
pm, kAq ÞÑ xpm, kq ,
while the decoder is a map
Dec : Rn ˆ t0, 1unB Ñ t0, 1unR
py, kBq ÞÑ pm .
Here, kA is known only to Alice while kB is known only to Bob.
‚ Randomized codes: Alice and Bob share nkey “ nRkey bits of common randomness, which is kept secret from James.
They may additionally have nA and nB bits of private randomness respectively. The encoder is a map
Enc : t0, 1unR ˆ t0, 1unA ˆ t0, 1unkey Ñ Rn
pm, kA, kq ÞÑ xpm, kA, kq ,
while the decoder is a map
Dec : Rn ˆ t0, 1unB ˆ t0, 1unkey Ñ t0, 1unR
py, kB , kq ÞÑ pm .
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Here, k is known to Alice and Bob, but not to James. The private randomness kA is known only to Alice, while kB is
known only to Bob.
In all our code constructions, we will not use any private randomness, i.e., nA “ nB “ 0. However, our converse results are
true for all values of nA and nB .
Probability of error. A decoding error occurs when Bob’s reconstruction does not match Alice’s message. The average (over
messages) probability of error P avge (also denoted by Pe for notational brevity in this paper) is defined as
Pe “ Pp pm ‰ mq “ 2nRÿ
m“1
Pp pm ‰ m,m “ mq “ 1
2nR
2nRÿ
m“1
Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq.
where the probability is taken over the private randomness in the encoder-decoder pair, the common randomness shared by
Alice and Bob, the noise to James, and any additional randomness he may use in choosing s. For deterministic codes,
Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq
“
ż
Bnp0,?nNq
ż
Rn
pz|xpz|xpmqqps|zps|zq1tDecpxpmq`sq‰mu dz ds.
For stochastic codes,
Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq
“ 1
2nB
2nBÿ
kB“1
ż
Bnp0,?nNq
ż
Rn
1
2nA
2nAÿ
kA“1
pz|xpz|xpm, kAqqps|zps|zq1tDecpxpm,kAq`s,kBq‰mu dz ds.
For randomized codes,
Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq
“ 1
2nB
2nBÿ
kB“1
ż
Bnp0,?nNq
ż
Rn
1
2nA
2nAÿ
kA“1
1
2nkey
2nkeyÿ
k“1
pz|xpz|xpm, kA, kqqps|zps|zq1tDecpxpm,kA,kq`s,kB ,kq‰mu dz ds.
Rate and capacity. A rate R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of pn,R, P,Nq codes Cpnq labelled by block-
length n such that each code in the sequence has rate Rpnq at least R and average probability of error P pnqe vanishing in n,
i.e.,
@n, Rpnq ě R, and lim
nÑ8P
pnq
e “ 0.
The capacity C of a communication system is the supremum of all achievable rates.
Remark VI.1. While sticking with maximum power constraint and average probability of error, we will strictly distinguish
between different criteria for James’ power constraint and Bob’s probability of error.
1) Maximum vs. average power constraint for James. We will not use average power constraint for James. Otherwise, no
positive rate is achievable under both maximum and average probability of error. This is because James can focus only
on a small constant fraction of codewords and allocates large enough power to completely corrupt them to ensure Bob
has no hope to decode them. Then Bob’s (maximum/average) probability of error is bounded away from zero while James’
jamming strategy still satisfies his average power constraint.
2) Maximum vs. average probability of error. As we know, in information theory, an achievability result under maximum
probability of error is stronger than that under average one, while it is the other way round for a converse result. In
adversarial channel model, if we adopt maximum probability of error, notice that it suffices for James to corrupt the
transmission of only one message. Thus we may assume that James knows the transmitted message a priori (but not
necessarily the transmitted codeword if Alice uses stochastic encoding where a message potentially corresponds to a bin
of codewords).
More formal justification of these criteria and their effect on capacity are given by Hughes and Narayan [7]. The authors
defined the notion of λ-capacity for different criteria.
Probability distributions of interest. Alternatively, the system can be described using probability distributions. We assume the
messages are uniformly distributed, i.e., pm “ Upr2nRsq. Given the message to be transmitted, the codewords are distributed
according to px|m. Notice that it is not necessarily a 0-1 distribution, i.e., the codeword may not be entirely determined by the
message, as Alice may have access to some private randomness and uses stochastic encoding. Each message may be attached
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Fig. 19: Approximation of surface area. The surface area of a cap Capn´1px, r, r1q is upper bounded by that of a sphere
Sn´1px, rq. It is lower bounded by the volume of a lower dimensional ball Bn´1px, rq since the intersection of an pn ´ 1q-
dimensional hyperplane parallel to the bottom of the cap passing through x and the ball BnpO, r1q whose surface the cap lives
on is an pn´ 1q-dimensional ball Bn´1px, rq.
with many codewords and Alice samples one codeword according to the distribution px|m and transmits it. James receives a
corrupted version z of x through an AWGN channel specified by
pz|xpz|xq “ pbnz|xpz|xq “ pbnz|xpx` pz ´ xq|xq “ pbnsz pz ´ xq,
where pbnsz “ N p0, σ2Inq. Based on his observation, James designs an attack vector s according to his jamming strategy
specified by ps|z. Again, notice that it is not necessarily a 0-1 distribution as James may have access to private randomness
and the output of his jamming may not be deterministic. Then Bob receives y which is the sum of x and s. In particular, y
is a deterministic function of the codeword transmitted in the main channel and the attack vector added to it, i.e.,
py|x,spy|x, sq “ 1ty“x`su.
Based on his observation, Bob reconstructs pm using a (potentially stochastic) decoder specified by pxm|y.
Area and volume. The area of an pn´ 1q-dimensional Euclidean sphere of radius r is given by
AreapSn´1p¨, rqq “ 2pi
n{2
Γpn{2qr
n´1.
The area of an pn ´ 1q-dimensional cap centered at x of radius r living on an pn ´ 1q-dimensional sphere of radius r1
can be lower bounded by the volume of an pn ´ 1q-dimensional ball centered at x of radius r since the intersection of an
pn´1q-dimensional sphere and an pn´1q-dimensional hyperplane is an pn´1q-dimensional ball, as shown in Figure 19, i.e.,
AreapCapn´1px, r, r1qq ě VolpBn´1px, rqq.
The area of a cap can also be upper bounded by a sphere of the same radius, i.e.,
AreapCapn´1px, r, r1qq ď 1
2
AreapSn´1px, rqq ď AreapSn´1px, rqq.
The volume of an n-dimensional Euclidean ball of radius r is given by
VolpBnp¨, rqq “ pi
n{2
Γpn{2` 1qr
n.
More facts about high-dimensional geometry can be found in the notes by Ball [28].
Error event decomposition. We will frequently apply the following lemma to decompose various decoding error events.
Lemma VI.2. For any event A and an error event B (which usually happens with tiny probability), we have PpAq ď
PpBq ` PpA|Bcq.
Proof. The claim follows from direct computation using law of total probability.
PpAq “PpAX Bq ` PpAX Bcq
ďPpBq ` PpBcqPpA|Bcq
ďPpBq ` PpA|Bcq.
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Fig. 20: The geometry corresponding to the tail bound of |xa, by| in Lemma VI.5.
Basic tail bounds. Standard tail bounds (see, for instance, the monograph by Boucheron et al. [29]) for Gaussians and
χ2-distributions are used at times throughout this paper.
Fact VI.3. If g „ N p0, σ2q, then Pp|g| ě q ď 2 exp
´
´ 22σ2
¯
.
Fact VI.4. If g „ N p0, σ2Inq, then }g}22 has (scaled) χ2-distribution and
Pp}g}22 ě nσ2p1` qq ď exp
ˆ
´
2
4
n
˙
,
Pp}g}22 ď nσ2p1´ qq ď exp
ˆ
´
2
2
n
˙
,
Pp}g}22 R nσ2p1˘ qq ď 2 exp
ˆ
´
2
4
n
˙
.
Lemma VI.5. Fix ζ ą 0 and b P Rn. If a is isotropically distributed on the sphere Sn´1p0, }a}2q, then
Pp|xa, by| ą nζq ď 2´
pn´1qn2ζ2
2}a}22}b}22 .
Proof. Let eb denote the unit vector along b, i.e., eb “ b{}b}2. Let e denote the random unit vector along a which is isotropically
distributed on the unit sphere Sn´1p0, 1q, i.e., e “ a{}a}2. Notice that |xa, by| ą nζ if and only if |xe, eby| ą nζ}a}2}b}2 , i.e., if
and only if e lies on one of two caps (shown in Figure 20) of height 1´ nζ}a}2}b}2 . Thus we have
Pp|xa, by| ą nζq “P
ˆ
|xe, eby| ą nζ}a}2}b}2
˙
“
2 Area
´
Capn´1
´
nζ
}a}2}b}2
b
}b}2 ,
b
1´ n2ζ2}a}22}b}22 , 1
¯¯
AreapSn´1p0, 1qq
ď
Area
´
Sn´1
´
0,
b
1´ n2ζ2}a}22}b}22
¯¯
AreapSn´1p0, 1qq
“2
´n´12 log
¨˚
˝ 1
1´ n2ζ2}a}22}b}22
‹˛‚
ď2´
pn´1qn2ζ2
2}a}22}b}22 ,
where the last step follows from the inequality log
´
1
1´x
¯
ě logp1` xq ě x for small enough positive x.
We now state a general lemma that will be useful in proving list-decoding results. This essentially says that if codewords
are chosen i.i.d. according to a uniform distribution, then the probability that more than Opn2q codewords lie within any
set of sufficiently small volume is super-exponentially decaying in n. A proof of this lemma for discrete case appeared in
Langberg’s [30, Lemma 2.1] paper. We give a general form and its proof for completeness.
18
Lemma VI.6. Suppose A Ď Rn and C “ txpmqu2nRm“1 Ď A contains 2nR, R ą 0 uniform samples from A. If V Ď A such that
for some small enough constant ν ą 0
p– Ppx P V q “ µpV q
µpAq ď 2
´pR`νqn, Ep|V X C|q “ p2nR “ 2´νn,
where x is sampled uniformly at random from A and µp¨q denotes the Lebesgue measure of a measurable subset of Rn, then
there exists some constant C “ Cpc, ν,Rq ą 0, s.t.,
Pp|V X C| ě cn2q ď 2´Cn3 .
Proof.
Pp|V X C| ě cn2q “
2nRÿ
i“cn2
ˆ
2nR
i
˙
pip1´ pq2nR´i
ď2nR
ˆ
2nR
cn2
˙
pcn
2p1´ pq2nR´cn2
ď2nR
ˆ
2nRe
cn2
˙cn2
2´pR`νqn¨cn
2
“2nR`cRn3`cplog eqn2´cn2 logpcn2q´cpR`νqn3
“2´cνn3´2cn2 logn`pc log e´c log cqn2`nR
ď2´Cn3 .
Remark VI.7. The above lemma indicates that the number of codewords falling into V is small (say at most polypnq) with
high probability as long as we can get an exponentially small upper bound on the expected number of such codewords.
VII. OUR RESULTS
We now describe the results in this paper w.r.t. decreasing values of nkey. We start with the case when there is an unlimited
amount of common randomness available between Alice and Bob. We make no claim of novelty in this result. The achievability
was given by Sarwate [12], and he also claimed the converse. For the sake of completeness, we give the converse, which will
also be useful later.
VIII. CAPACITY OF THE MYOPIC ADVERSARIAL CHANNEL WHEN Rkey “ 8
Sarwate [12] showed the following:
Lemma VIII.1 ([12]). As shown in Figure 21, the capacity of the myopic adversarial channel with an unlimited amount of
common randomness is
Cmyop,rand “
$’’’&’’’%
RLD – 12 log
P
N ,
σ2
P ď 1N{P ´ 1
RLD,myop – 12 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qpP`Nq´2P
?
NpP`σ2q
Nσ2
˙
, σ
2
P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
0, σ
2
P ď NP ´ 1
. (VIII.2)
An important point to note here is that the capacity is not necessarily zero when N ă P . As we shall see in subsequent
sections, even a small amount of common randomness can let us achieve a positive rate in parts of this region.
The achievability part of the proof uses a random coding argument. The converse can be proved by specifying an attack
for James that instantiates an AWGN channel from Alice to Bob having the capacity given by (VIII.2). The converse is quite
straightforward and was skipped in [12]. A rigorous proof is presented in the next section for completeness. We also feel that
this gives us some insight as to what optimal attack strategies for James might be, and hence give a detailed argument.
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Fig. 21: Results on Gaussian AVCs due to Sarwate [12]. For N{P ă 1 the results are identical as in this paper (though we
provide a finer characterization on the amount of common randomness needed. For N{P ě 1, [12] gave an incorrect claim
that Cmyop,rand = 0. This is corrected in this work, in Section VIII-A.
A. Proof of converse: “scale-and-babble” attack
The converse involves what we call a “scale-and-babble” attack strategy for James. This attack essentially converts the
myopic channel into an equivalent AWGN channel. Since the capacity of the AWGN channel cannot be increased using
common randomness, this gives us an upper bound on the capacity for all values of nkey. We make no claim about the
originality of this proof, as the strategy is well-known (and maybe dates back to Blachman [3], as suggested by Sarwate [12]).
But we nevertheless provide the details to keep the paper self-contained.
The strategy for James is the following: He uses a certain fraction of his power to subtract a negatively scaled version of
his observation; the remainder of his power is used to add AWGN. Specifically,
s “ βp´αz` gq “ βp´αpx` szq ` gq, (VIII.3)
where4
β “
#
1, } ´ αz` g}2 ď
?
nN?
nN
}´αz`g}2 “: β 1, otherwise
,
α ą 0 is a constant to be optimized subject to N ´ α2pP ` σ2q ě 0, i.e., α ď aN{pP ` σ2q. Also, g „ N p0, γ2Inq with
α2pP ` σ2q ` γ21´ “ N , for a small  ą 0. Therefore, γ2 “ pN ´ α2pP ` σ2qqp1´ q, and Ppβ ‰ 1q “ Pp} ´ αz` g}2 ą?
nNq “ 2´Ωpnq. Then
y “ x` s “
#
x´ αpx` szq ` g “ p1´ αqx´ αsz ` g, } ´ αz` g}2 ď
?
nN
x` β 1p´αpx` szq ` gq “ p1´ β 1αqx´ β 1αsz ` β 1g, otherwise .
The scaling factor β is introduced to make the attack vector satisfy the power constraint. Note that the channel above is not
exactly an AWGN channel. However, the probability that β ‰ 1 is exponentially small in n. We have the following claim,
formally proved in Appendix D.
Claim VIII.4. Fix 0 ă  ă 1, and let α be nonnegative. If γ2 “ pN ´ α2pP ` σ2qqp1 ´ q, then the capacity CAWGN of the
channel (VIII.3) from x to y is upper bounded as follows
CAWGN ă 1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
α2σ2 ` γ2
˙
. (VIII.5)
Using Claim VIII.4, we have
Cmyop,rand ă 1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
α2σ2 ` γ2
˙
“ 1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
N ´ α2P
˙
` gp, P,N, σ2, αq,
4Here, β is a factor introduced to handle atypicality in the noise. As we show subsequently, the value of β is 1 with high probability.
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(a) fpαq with N{P “ 0.9.
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(b) fpαq with N{P “ 1.1.
Fig. 22: Optimization of fpαq.
where gp, P,N, σ2, αq Ñ 0 as Ñ 0. Since this holds for every  ą 0, and every 0 ă α ďaN{pP ` σ2q, we can say that
Cmyop,rand ă min
0ăαď
?
N{pP`σ2q
1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
N ´ α2P
˙
. (VIII.6)
Denote fpαq– p1´αq2PN´α2P and Rpαq– 12 logp1` fpαqq. The minimum points of fpαq are α “ N{P, 1.
1) N{P ă 1 (See Figure 22a with P {N “ 1.1).
a) If N{P ăaN{pP ` σ2q, i.e., σ2P ă 1N{P ´ 1, then
min
0ăαď
?
N{pP`σ2q
Rpαq “ 1
2
logp1` fpN{P qq “ 1
2
log
P
N
.
b) If N{P ěaN{pP ` σ2q, i.e., σ2P ě 1N{P ´ 1, then
min
0ăαď
?
N{pP`σ2q
Rpαq “1
2
log
˜
1` f
˜c
N
P ` σ2
¸¸
“1
2
log
˜
pP ` σ2qpP `Nq ´ 2PaNpP ` σ2q
Nσ2
¸
— RLD,myop.
Notice that if σ Ñ8, the channel becomes oblivious. It is easy to check that
lim
σÑ8
1
2
log
˜
pP ` σ2qpP `Nq ´ 2PaNpP ` σ2q
Nσ2
¸
“ 1
2
log
ˆ
1` P
N
˙
,
consistent with the oblivious capacity of quadratically constrained channels.
2) N{P ă 1 (See Figure 22b with P {N “ 0.9).
a) If
a
N{pP ` σ2q ě 1, i.e., σ2P ď NP ´ 1, then
min
0ăαď
?
N{pP`σ2q
Rpαq “ 1
2
logp1` fp1qq “ 0.
b) If
a
N{pP ` σ2q ă 1, i.e., σ2P ą NP ´ 1, then
min
0ăαď
?
N{pP`σ2q
Rpαq “ 1
2
log
˜
1` f
˜c
N
P ` σ2
¸¸
“ RLD,myop.
The upper bound on the capacity given by the scale-and-babble attack is shown in Figure 23.
The scale-and-babble attack converts the adversarial channel into an equivalent AWGN channel. The capacity of the point-
to-point AWGN channel cannot be increased using private/common randomness. Therefore, the upper bounds obtained using
this technique hold regardless of whether deterministic/stochastic/randomized codes are used, and regardless of the amount of
common randomness shared by the encoder and decoder (since common randomness/stochastic encoding does not boost the
capacity of discrete memoryless channels (DMCs)).
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Fig. 23: The upper bound of capacity given by scale-and-babble attack.
IX. LINEAR AND SUBLINEAR AMOUNTS OF COMMON RANDOMNESS
We now discuss two possibilities: (1) nkey is Θpnq, and (2) nkey is Θplog nq. The rate given by Lemma VIII.1 is an upper
bound on the capacity in both cases. We will show that this is achievable in a subregion of the NSRs. Our approach will
involve a myopic list-decoding argument, which we will prove next. We will combine this with Langberg’s [27] technique
which uses Θplog nq bits of common randomness to disambiguate the list and give us a result for unique decoding. Before we
state the main results, we take a brief detour to discuss classical and myopic list-decoding.
A. List-decoding
Consider the quadratically constrained adversarial channel model where James observes z, which is a noisy copy of x. We
study the list-decoding problem, which we now describe. In the list-decoding problem, the decoder is not required to recover
the transmitted message exactly but can instead output a (small) list of messages with the guarantee that the true message
is in the list. We are typically interested in list-sizes that are constant or grow as a low-degree polynomial function of the
blocklength.
List-decoding, as an important relaxation of unique decoding which is also interesting in its own right, is extensively studied
under various models in the literature of coding theory and information theory. The usual notion of list-decoding studied in
classical coding theory concerns codes over finite fields. The errors usually considered are introduced in a worst-case manner
by an omniscient adversary. In particular, the most commonly studied errors are bit-flips and erasures.
List-decodability against a bit-flip adversary is defined as follows.
Definition IX.1. A code C Ď Fnq is said to be pp, Lq-list-decodable if for every y P Fnq , |BnHp0, npq X C| ď L.
In this case, it is well-known [31] that the list-decoding capacity is 1´Hqppq. Namely, there exist pp,Op1{qq-list-decodable
codes of rate 1´Hqppq ´ ; on the other hand, any code of rate 1´Hqppq `  is pp, 2Ωpnqq-list-decodable.
List-decodability against an erasure adversary is defined as follows.
Definition IX.2. A code C Ď Fnq is said to be pp, Lq-erasure-list-decodable if for every y P Fnq and any S Ď rns of size at
most np, |tx P C : xS “ ySu| ď L. Here, for v P Fnq and T Ď rns, we use the notation vT P F
|T |
q to denote the vector v
restricted to coordinates in T .
As with the bit-flip case, it is well-known (see, e.g., Theorem 10.9 of Guruswami’s thesis [32]) that the erasure-list-decoding
capacity is 1 ´ p. Namely, there exist pp,Op1{qq-erasure-list-decodable codes of 1 ´ p ´ ; on the other hand, any code of
rate 1´ p`  is pp, 2Ωpnqq-erasure-list-decodable.
Now we turn to our setting and recall the formal definition of list-decoding in quadratically constrained model.
Definition IX.3. Fix R ą 0 and nkey ě 0. A codebook C “ txpm, kq : m P r2nRs, k P r2nkey su is said to be pP,N,Lq-list-
decodable at rate R with nkey bits of common randomness if
‚ }xpm, kq}2 ď
?
nP for all m, k; and
‚ for all possible randomized functions s – spC, zq satisfying Pp}s}2 ď
?
nNq “ 1, we have
Pp|Bnpx` s,
?
nNq X Cpkq| ą Lq “ op1q,
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where Cpkq – txpm, kq : m P r2nRsu. In the above equation, the averaging is over the randomness in5 m,k, sz and s.
A rate R is said to be achievable for pP,N,Lq-list-decoding with nkey bits of common randomness if there exist sequences of
codebooks (in increasing n) that are pP,N,Lq-list-decodable. The list-decoding capacity is the supremum over all achievable
rates.
As a warm-up, let us consider the omniscient adversary. We have the following folk theorem.
Lemma IX.4. Let σ “ 0 and nkey “ 0. If  – 12 log PN ´R ą 0, then R is achievable for
`
P,N,Ω
`
1
 log
1

˘˘
-list-decoding.
If R ą 12 log PN , then no sequence of codebooks of rate R is pP,N, nOp1qq-list-decodable. Therefore, for polynomial list-sizes,
the list-decoding capacity is equal to 12 log
P
N .
Although the above result is folklore, we are not aware of a reference with a formal proof of this statement. For completeness,
and to keep the paper self-contained, we give a proof in Appendix C.
B. List-decoding with a myopic adversary
In the case where σ ą 0, we can achieve a higher list-decoding rate for certain values of N{P and σ2{P . We show that when
noise level to James is large enough (he is “sufficiently myopic”), he is unable to exactly determine x from z. Conditioned
on z, the transmitted codeword lies in a thin strip which is roughly
?
nσ2 away from z. If R is large enough, then the strip
will contain exponentially many codewords, and James cannot distinguish the true codeword from the others. Since we use a
random code, these codewords are roughly uniformly distributed over the strip. An effective value of s for one codeword on
the strip (in the sense of ensuring maximum confusion for Bob) may be ineffective for most of the remaining codewords. As
a result, there is no single direction where James can align s in order to guarantee the level of confusion that Bob could have
if he were omniscient. This is what will let us achieve a higher rate.
We will consider the case nkey “ nRkey, for some Rkey ě 0. Even the case when Rkey “ 0 is non-trivial – see Figure 3a
for a region.
Theorem IX.5. For pP,N,Opn2qq-list-decoding, the capacity is lower bounded as follows
Cmyop,LD ě
#
RLD,myop, if σ
2
P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
and RLD,myop `Rkey ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
RLD, otherwise
.
These are summarized in Fig. 3.
The rate RLD is achievable even in the presence of an omniscient adversary. The main contribution of this work is in
showing that myopicity indeed does help, and we can obtain a higher rate of RLD,myop in a certain regime. It is interesting to
note that even when nkey “ 0, the myopic list-decoding capacity is nonzero for sufficiently large values of σ2{P . Furthermore,
increasing rates of common randomness (Rkey) help us achieve higher list-decoding rates as seen from Fig. 3. We now provide
a sketch of the proof, but relegate the details to Sec. XI.
1) Proof sketch: First, observe that RLD is achievable as long as N ă P . This is true since RLD is achievable even with an
omniscient adversary (Lemma IX.4). The nontrivial step is in showing that a higher rate of RLD,myop is achievable in a certain
regime of the NSRs. We will prove the achievability using random spherical codes. The 2npR`Rkeyq codewords are sampled
independently and uniformly at random from Sn´1p0,?nP q. This is partitioned into 2nRkey codebooks, each containing 2nR
codewords. The value of the shared key determines which of the 2nRkey codebooks is used for transmission. Since Bob has
access to the key, he has to decode one of 2nR codewords. We analyze the probability of error taking James’ point of view. To
James, one of 2npR`Rkeyq codewords is chosen at random, and the code is pP,N,Opn2qq-list-decodable with high probability
if no attack vector s can force a list-size of Ωpn2q for a nonvanishing fraction of the codewords.
Conditioned on z, the true codeword x lies in a thin strip at distance approximately
?
nσ2 to z. We show Lemma XI.27 that
as long as the codebook rate R`Rkey is greater than 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
, this strip (with high probability) contains exponentially
many codewords, thereby causing sufficient confusion for James. This condition effectively limits the values of the NSRs where
RLD,myop is achievable.
For ease of analysis, we assume that James has access to an oracle, which reveals a subset of 2n codewords from the
strip. This set is guaranteed to contain the true codeword. Clearly, the oracle only makes James more powerful, and any result
that holds in this setting also continues to be valid when there is no oracle. The codewords in the oracle-given set (OGS)
are all independent (over the randomness in the codebook) and are approximately uniformly (which we call quasi-uniformly)
distributed over the strip. See Lemma XI.24 for a formal statement. The codewords outside the oracle-given set are independent
of these, and are uniformly distributed over the sphere. From the point of view of James, the true codeword is quasiuniformly
distributed over the OGS.
5Note that we are using an average probability of error in our work. This is different from a maximum probability of error, where the list-size is required
to be less than or equal to L for every codeword. On the other hand, we are satisfied with this being true for all but a vanishingly small fraction of the
codewords.
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confusing c.w.
confused c.w.
transmitted c.w.
Bob’s (potentially) 
received vector
c.w. in the OGS
Fig. 24: Intuition behind myopic list-decoding. From the point of view of James, the true codeword is quasiuniformly distributed
over the OGS. The best-case scenario for James would be to “push” the true codeword towards the origin. However, for any fixed
attack vector s, only a small fraction of the codewords in the OGS lead to a large overlap with Sn´1p0,?nP q (which could
lead to a large list-size). For a randomly chosen codeword from the OGS, the overlap of the decoding ball with Sn´1p0,?nP q
is small with high probability.
We fix an attack vector s, and bound the probability that this forces a list-size greater than L for a significant fraction of the
codewords in the oracle-given set. To do so, we find the typical area of the decoding region Bnpx`s,?nNqXSn´1p0,?nP q
by computing the typical norm of y. This decoding region is a cap, whose area is maximized when the radius of the cap (see
Sec. V) is
?
nN . This would be the result of James’ attack if he were omniscient. However, due to the randomness in sz and
his uncertainty about x, the typical radius is considerably less than
?
nN . It is this reduction in the typical radius that helps us
achieve rates above RLD. The value of the typical radius is the solution of an optimization problem, which is identical (under
a change of variables) to the one we obtain when analyzing the scale-and-babble attack in Sec. VIII-A. See Fig. 24 for an
illustration. This is proved in Sec. XI-H, with some of the calculations appearing in subsequent subsections.
With an upper bound on the typical decoding volume, we can bound the probability that there are more than L codewords in
the decoding region. We separately handle the codewords within and outside the oracle-given set. The probability that a fixed s
causes list-decoding failure for a significant fraction of codewords in the oracle-given set is found to decay superexponentially
in n. We complete the proof using a covering argument for s and taking a union bound over all representative attack vectors
sQ.
C. Achievable rates using Θpnq bits of CR
The following lemma by Sarwate (originally proved by Langberg [27] for the bit-flip channel) says that a list-decodable
code can be converted to a uniquely decodable code with an additional Oplog nq bits of common randomness. Although the
lemma was stated in the context of discrete AVCs with deterministic encoding, the proof goes through even without these
restrictions. We can use our list-decodable code as a black box in the following lemma to go from a list-decodable code to a
uniquely decodable code.
For an arbitrary AVC W , we define an pn,R,L, q-list-decodable code as one which has blocklength n, message rate R,
and achieves a list-size of L with probability 1´ .
Lemma IX.6 (Lemma 13, [24]). Suppose we have a deterministic pn,R,L, q-list-decodable code for an AVC W . If the
encoder-decoder pair shares nkey bits of common randomness, then there exists a blocklength-n code of rate R ´ nkey2n such
that the decoder can recover the transmitted message with probability 1´ ´ 1, where
1 –
2nLR
nkey2nkey{2
.
The above lemma says that an additional nkey “ 2 logpnLq bits of common randomness is sufficient to disambiguate the
list. If L “ nOp1q, then the nkey required is only logarithmic, and the penalty in the rate nkey2n is vanishing in n.
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We can therefore use this with our myopic list-decoding result in Theorem IX.5 to obtain achievable rates. Combining this
with the converse in Lemma VIII.1, we obtain
Lemma IX.7. If Alice and Bob share nRkey bits of common randomness, then the capacity is
Cmyop “
$’’&’’%
RLD,myop, if σ
2
P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, NP ´ 1
)
and Rkey ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘´RLD,myop
RLD,
σ2
P ď 1N{P ´ 1
0, σ
2
P ď NP ´ 1
.
Furthermore,
RLD ď Cmyop ď RLD,myop if σ
2
P
ě max
"
1
N{P ´ 1,
N
P
´ 1
*
, and Rkey ă 1
2
log
ˆ
1` P
σ2
˙
´RLD,myop.
These results are pictorially summarized in Figs. 4 and 5.
The rates achievable for different values of the NSRs are illustrated in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 for different values of Rkey. Our
scheme achieves capacity in the red and blue regions of Fig. 4 and 5. In the white dotted region, RLD is a lower bound on the
capacity, as guaranteed by Lemma IX.7. However, we can achieve RLD,myop with an infinite amount of common randomness.
Hence, there is a small gap between the upper and lower bounds in this region. In the cyan dotted region, RLD ă 0 and our
lower bound is trivial, while the converse says that the capacity is upper bounded by RLD,myop.
D. Achievable rates with Θplog nq bits of CR
Lemma IX.6 says that Θplog nq bits of common randomness is sufficient to disambiguate the list. Using this with Theo-
rem IX.5 for Rkey “ 0, we have Lemma IX.8. Note that when Rkey “ 0, the condition RLD,myop ` Rkey ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
reduces to σ
2
P ě 4NP ´ 1.
Lemma IX.8. When nkey “ Θplog nq, the capacity of the myopic adversarial channel is:
Cmyop “
$’’&’’%
RLD,myop, if σ
2
P ě max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 4NP ´ 1
)
RLD,
σ2
P ď 1N{P ´ 1
0, σ
2
P ď NP ´ 1
.
Furthermore,
RLD ď Cmyop ď RLD,myop if max
"
1
N{P ´ 1,
N
P
´ 1
*
ď σ
2
P
ď 4N
P
´ 1.
These results are summarized in Fig. 6.
These results are illustrated in Fig. 6. We have matching upper and lower bounds in the red, blue, and grey regions. As in
the previous subsection, there is a nontrivial gap between the upper and lower bounds in the green and white regions.
X. NO COMMON RANDOMNESS
When Alice and Bob do not have access to a shared secret key, the achievability proofs in Sec. IX-C and IX-D are not
valid, and for certain values of the NSRs, tighter converses can be obtained. This scenario requires more work, and we are
able to prove the following result.
Theorem X.1. The capacity of the myopic adversarial channel with Θplog nq bits of common randomness is given by
Cmyop “
$’’&’’%
RLD, if 11´N{P ´ 1 ď σ
2
P ď 1N{P ´ 1
RLD,myop, if σ
2
P ě max
!
1
1´N{P ´ 1, 1N{P ´ 1
)
0, if σ
2
P ď 4NP ´ 2 or NP ě 1
.
In the other regimes, we have
RGV ď Cmyop ď
$&%RLD, if 4
N
P ´ 2 ď σ
2
P ď min
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 11´N{P ´ 1
)
RLD,myop, if max
!
1
N{P ´ 1, 4NP ´ 2
)
ď σ2P ď 11´N{P ´ 1 and NP ď 1
.
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1) Proof sketch: The proof involves two parts:
‚ The upper bounds are obtained using Lemma VIII.1, and symmetrization arguments described in Sec. X-2.
‚ The achievability involves a combination of list-decoding, reverse list-decoding, and the grid argument. We give a high-
level description below. For the rigorous proof, see Sec. XII.
The achievability proof uses several ideas from our discussion on myopic list-decoding in Sec. IX-B1. As discussed in
Sec. IX-B1, the transmitted codeword lies in a strip. We can only prove our result in the sufficiently myopic case, i.e.,
when the strip contains exponentially many codewords. This is possible only if R ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
. Just as in the proof of
myopic list-decoding, we assume that James has access to an oracle-given set. Our goal is to show that there exists no attack
strategy for James that would cause decoding failure for a significant fraction of codewords in the oracle-given set.
See Fig. 24. Let us fix an s. We say that a codeword x1 confuses x if Bnpx`s,?nNq contains x1. From James’ perspective,
the codewords in the oracle-given set are (approximately6) equally likely to have been transmitted. We say that decoding fails
if the attack vector chosen by James causes x to be confused with another codeword. To analyze this, we study the effect of
s simultaneously over all codewords in the oracle-given set. The set
Ť
mPOrcl Bnpxpmq ` s,
?
nNq forms a “blob”. We show
that the probability that the blob contains more than n4 confusing codewords7 is vanishingly small. This ensures that there are
only a polynomial number of codewords that could potentially confuse the exponentially many codewords in the oracle-given
set.
We then find the number of codewords xpmq in the OGS that could potentially be confused by a fixed x1. We call this reverse
list-decoding, and show that each x1 can confuse only polynomially many codewords in the OGS. Our reverse list-decoding
argument holds if σ
2
P ě 11´N{P ´ 1.
We combine the blob list-decoding and reverse list-decoding results and give a combinatorial argument to show that the
probability of a fixed s causing a decoding error for a significant fraction of codewords in the OGS is super-exponentially
decaying in n. We categorise the error into two types:
‚ Type I: The “confusing” codeword does not lie within the OGS. Blob list-decoding and reverse list-decoding in this case
are studied in Sec. XII-A.
‚ Type II: The “confusing” codeword lies within the OGS. This is studied in Sec. XII-B.
We then use a standard covering argument for s and show that the average probability of decoding error is also vanishing
in n. This will complete the proof of Theorem X.1.
2) An improved converse using symmetrization: When the encoder is a deterministic map from the set of messages to Rn,
we can give a better upper bound for certain values of the NSRs. This attack is based on the scaled babble-and-push attack
designed by Li et al. [26] for the quadratically constrained channel with a causal adversary. The basic idea in a symmetrization
argument is to make sure that Bob is equally confused between the actual transmitted codeword and a random codeword
independently chosen by James. Bob will then be unable to distinguish between the two codewords and therefore makes an
error with nonvanishing probability.
Lemma X.2. If nkey “ 0, then Cmyop “ 0 when N ě P or σ2P ă 4NP ´ 2.
Proof. The first part is considerably simpler, and involves a z-agnostic symmetrization argument. If N ě P , then James can
mimic Alice. A simple attack strategy is the following: He generates a message m1 uniformly at random, and independently of
everything else. Using the same encoding strategy that Alice uses, this is mapped to a codeword s “ x1 which is transmitted.
Bob receives x ` x1, and unless m1 “ m, he will be unable to determine whether Alice sent m or m1. The probability of
error is therefore bounded away from zero, and this is true for all R ą 0. Therefore, the capacity is zero when N ě P .
To prove the second part, when σ
2
P ă 4NP ´2, we use a z-aware symmetrization attack. Since James is myopic, he has to do
more work to make Bob equally confused between m and m1. Here, James picks a random codeword x1 uniformly from the
codebook and “pushes” z to the midpoint of z and x1. Bob is then unable to distinguish between x and x1, and will therefore
make an error with nonvanishing probability.
If N ě P , then Bob can mimic Alice by generating a message m1 uniformly at random, independently of everything else,
and then transmitting the corresponding codeword (say x1). Bob receives x` x1, and with probability 1´ 2´nR is unable to
determine whether Alice transmitted m or m1. Therefore, the probability of error is always bounded away from zero.
For the case when σ
2
P ă 4NP ´2, we give a slightly different attack. James samples m1 „ pm,x1 „ px|m, both independently
of Alice, and setting
s “ 1
2
βpx1 ´ zq “ 1
2
βpx1 ´ x´ szq,
where
β “
$&%1,
›› 1
2 px1 ´ zq
››
2
ď ?nN?
nN
} 12 px1´zq}2 “: β
1, otherwise , (X.3)
6We add this qualifier since all points in the strip are not equidistant from z.
7The degree of the polynomial here is not important, but is chosen to be 4 for convenience. What matters is that the list-size grows polynomially in n.
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such that
y “ x` s “
#
x` 12 px1 ´ x´ szq “ 12 px1 ` xq ´ 12sz,
›› 1
2 px1 ´ zq
››
2
ď ?nN
x` 12β 1px1 ´ x´ szq “
`
1´ 12β 1
˘
x` 12β 1x1 ´ 12β 1sz, otherwise
.
We introduce β merely to ensure that the attack vector always satisfies James’ power constraint. We don’t care much about
the second case in Equation X.3, since the probability of the second case goes to zero. Hence, even if Bob may be able to
decode the message in the second case, we show that in the first case his probability of error is going to be bounded away
from zero. Assume we operate at a rate R. The probability of error can be lower bounded by
Pe “Pp pm ‰ mq
ěPp pm ‰ m, }s}2 ď ?nNq
“Pp}s}2 ď
?
nNqPp pm ‰ m|}s}2 ď ?nNq
ě1
2
Pp}s}2 ď
?
nNq,
where the last inequality comes from the following argument. Suppose that James has enough power to push the channel output
y to px` x1q{2 even when sz “ 0, and that Bob knew that his observation y is the average of x and x18. In this case, Bob
cannot distinguish whether x or x1 was transmitted and his probability of decoding error is no less than 1{2. Note that, in the
myopic case we are considering, Bob’s observation y “ px` x1q{2´ sz{2 also contains a (scaled) random noise component
other than the average of two codewords. The noise is completely random and independent of everything else, hence it does
not provide Bob with any information of m and a decoding error will occur still with probability at least 1{2.
The probability Pp}s}2 ď
?
nNq can be bounded using Markov’s inequality. Specifically,
Ep}s}22q “E
˜››››12 px1 ´ x´ szq
››››2
2
¸
“1
4
pEp}x1}22q ` Ep}x}22q ` Ep}sz}22q ´ 2Epxx1,xyq ´ 2Epxx1, szyq ` 2Epxx, szyqq
“1
4
˜
2Ep}x}22q ` Ep}sz}22q ´ 2
ÿ
i“1
Epx1ixiq
¸
“1
4
˜
2nP ` nσ2 ´ 2
ÿ
i“1
E
`
x1i
˘
Epxiq
¸
(X.4)
“1
4
˜
2nP ` nσ2 ´ 2
ÿ
i“1
pEpxiqq2
¸
(X.5)
ď1
4
p2nP ` nσ2q,
where Equation X.4 and Equation X.5 follow since x1 and x are i.i.d. Then we have
Pe ě 1
2
Pp}s}2 ď
?
nNq ě 1
2
ˆ
1´
1
4 p2nP ` nσ2q
nN
˙
“ 1
2
ˆ
1´ 2P ` σ
2
4N
˙
.
If 2P ` σ2 ă 4N , say 4N “ p1 ` qp2P ` σ2q for some constant  ą 0, then Pe is bounded away from zero, i.e.,
Pe ě 12
´
1´ 11`
¯
“ 2p1`q . Thus no positive rate is achievable when σ
2
P ă 4NP ´ 2.
Remark X.6. The argument above subsumes one way to prove the Plotkin bound (via the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality – see,
say, Li et al. [26]) with the additional randomness in sz .
XI. MYOPIC LIST-DECODING
A. Coding scheme
Codebook construction. We use random spherical codes. Before the communication, Alice samples 2npR`Rkeyq codewords
txpm, kq : m P r2nRs, k P r2nRkey su independently and uniformly at random from the sphere Sn´1 `0,?nP ˘. Once sampled,
the codebook is fixed and revealed to every party: Alice, Bob and James. Notice that all codewords satisfy Alice’s power
constraint }x}2 ď
?
nP . We define Cpkq – txpm, kq : m P r2nRsu to be the kth codebook. We also distinguish the message
rate R from the codebook rate Rcode – R`Rkey.
8Notice that there may exist other pairs of codewords with the same average.
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Encoder. Let k P r2nRkey s be the realization of the secret key shared by Alice and Bob. Alice sends xpm, kq if she wants to
transmit message m to Bob.
Decoder. Bob uses a minimum distance decoder. Receiving y, he outputs pm such that the corresponding codeword xppm, kq is
the nearest (in Euclidean distance) one in Cpkq to his observation, i.e.,
pm “ argmin
m1Pt0,1unR
}xpm1, kq ´ y}2.
For the rest of this section, we fix two quantities:  is a small positive constant independent of n, and δ is a parameter that
decays as Θpplog nq{nq.
B. The strips and the oracle-given set (OGS)
Let L “ 3n2. To simplify the proof, we prove the achievability part under a more powerful adversary who has access to
an oracle in addition to z. The oracle reveals a random subset of 2n codewords that contains the transmitted codeword and
others that are all at approximately the same distance to z. We call it an oracle-given set, denoted Orclpz,xq. Conditioned on
James’ knowledge, the transmitted codeword is independent of all codewords outside the oracle-given set. We now describe
the rule that assigns a pair px, zq to an OGS.
Choose any optimal covering Z of Shnp0,anpP ` σ2qp1˘ qq such that minz1PZ }z´ z1}2 ď ?nδZ for all z in the shell.
It turns out that the size of such a covering can be bounded as follows.
|Z| ď
˜
VolpBnp0,anpP ` σ2qp1` q ` ?nδZqq
VolpBnp0,?nδZqq
¸1`op1q
“
˜apP ` σ2qp1` q ` ?δZ?
δZ
¸np1`op1qq
— cn,δZ . (XI.1)
Given z, let zQ – arg minz1PZ }z ´ z1}2 denote the closest point to z in Z (a.k.a. the quantization of z). For each zQ P Z ,
and i P t´{δ ` 1, . . . , {δu, define the i-th strip
Strn´1pzQ, iq– Sn´1p0,
?
nP q X ShnpzQ,
a
nσ2p1` pi´ 1qδq,anσ2p1` iδqq (XI.2)
to be the set of all points on the coding sphere at a distance of at least
a
nσ2p1` pi´ 1qδq but at most anσ2p1` iδq away
from zQ. We claim that
Ť
zQ
Ť
i Strn´1pzQ, iq “ Sn´1p0,
?
nP q. Let C :“ txpm, kq : m P r2nRs, k P r2nRkey su denote the
codebook. Define
MstrpzQ, iq– tpm, kq : xpm, kq P Strn´1pzQ, iqu (XI.3)
to be the set of indices of the codewords that lie in Strn´1pzQ, iq. We partition this set of indices into blocks of size 2n each
(except perhaps the last block) in the lexicographic order of pm, kq. Let tOrclpjqpzQ, iqu`j“1 denote the partition, where ` –
r|MstrpzQ, iq|{2ns. Each of these blocks constitutes an oracle-given set. If pm, kq corresponding to the transmitted codeword
xpm, kq lies in the µth block OrclpµqpzQ, λq of the partition of the λth strip MstrpzQ, λq for some λ P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu
and µ P r`s, then the oracle reveals OrclpzQ, xq– OrclpµqpzQ, λq to James.
Remark XI.4. It is important to note that all sets defined above (strips, OGSs, etc.) are designed a priori, before communication
takes place.
C. Error events
Define
Lpkqpxpmq, sq–tw P r2nRs : xpw, kq P Bnpxpm, kq ` s,?nNq X Cpkqu
“tw P r2nRs : }xpw, kq ´ xpm, kq ´ s}2 ď
?
nNu
for m P r2nRs, k P r2nRkey s, s P Bnp0,?nNq. Recall that to prove the existence of a list-decodable code, we want to show
that
P
´
Ds P Bnp0,?nNq, |tpm,kq P Orclpz,xq : |Lpkqpxpmq, sq| ą Lu| ą 2np´hp,τ,δS ,δZq{2q
¯
“ op1q,
where 0 ă hp, τ, δS , δZq ă 2 is a vanishing function in each of its variables. In particular, we can take hpq “ 32 by setting
τ , δS and δZ to be proper functions in . To analyze this, we define a number of error events.
Choose any optimal covering S of Bnp0,?nNq such that mins1PS }s ´ s1}2 ď ?nδS for all s in the ball. Given s,
let sQ – arg mins1PS }s ´ s1}2 denote the closest point to s in S (a.k.a. the quantization of s). By similar calculation to
Equation (XI.1), we have
|S| ď
˜?
N `?δS?
δS
¸np1`op1qq
— cnδS . (XI.5)
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We say that list-decoding fails if any of the following events occurs. We will ultimately show that the probability of failure
is negligible. The error events that we analyze are listed below:
Eatyp James’ observation z behaves atypically, or equivalently, the noise sz to James behaves atypically.
Eatyp1 –t}sz}2 R
a
nσ2p1˘ qu. (XI.6)
Eatyp2 –t| cosp=x,sz q| ě u. (XI.7)
Eatyp3 –t}z}2 R
a
npP ` σ2qp1˘ qu. (XI.8)
Hence the error event Eatyp is the union of the above three events.
Eatyp – Eatyp1 Y Eatyp2 Y Eatyp3 . (XI.9)
Estr One of the strips tStrn´1pzQ, iqui contains fewer than 23n codewords.
Estrpiq–t|MstrpzQ, iq| ă 23nu. (XI.10)
Estr –
ď
i
Estrpiq. (XI.11)
Eorcl Another minor technical issue to worry about is: The last OGS may be substantially smaller than the others, hence could
have a higher probability of error. But the probability that the transmitted codeword happens to fall into the last set is small.
Call Eorcl the event that the message corresponding to the transmitted codeword belongs to the last block Orclp`qpzQ, λq
of the partition of MstrpzQ, λq.
Eorcl – tµ “ `u. (XI.12)
ELD-rad For any pm, kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq and sQ P S, let
b
n ¨ rpm, sQq be the radius of the list-decoding region Bnpxpm, kq `
sQ,
?
nN ` ?nδSq X Sn´1p0,
?
nP q (which is nothing but a cap) of xpm, kq under sQ. We expect r – rpm, sQq to
concentrate around certain typical value ropt – roptpsQq “ Eprq over the OGS. Let ELD-radpm, sQq denote the event that
rpm, sQq is atypical, i.e., r is significantly larger than its expectation ropt.
ELD-radpm, sQq–trpm, sQq ą roptpsQqp1` f11p, δSqqu, (XI.13)
for some small function f11p, δSq to be determined later.
EsQ Define
ψpzQ, i, j, sQq–|tpm, kq P OrclpzQ, xq : rpm, sQq ą roptpsQqp1` f11p, δSqqu|
“
ÿ
pm,kqPOrclpjqpzQ,iq
1trpm,sQqąroptpsQqp1`f11p,δSqqu
“
ÿ
pm,kqPOrclpjqpzQ,iq
1ELD-radpm,sQq (XI.14)
to be the number of messages in the OGS whose encodings have atypical list-decoding radii. Let EsQ be the event that
there are more than n2 such messages in the OGS.
EsQ –tψpzQ, i, j, sQq ą n2u. (XI.15)
ELD Given that none of Eatyp, Estr, Eorcl occurs, there exists an attack vector sQ P S that results in a list-size greater than L
for at least one codeword in the oracle-given set. For each k, zQ, i, j, sQ, define
χpzQ, i, j, sQq :“|tpm, kq P OrclpzQ, xq : |Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą Lu|
“
ÿ
pm,kqPOrclpjqpzQ,iq
1t|Lpkqpxpmq,sQq|ąLu (XI.16)
to be the number of codewords in an oracle-given set that result in a large list-size when perturbed by sQ. Then, we
define
ELDpzQ, i, j, sQq–tDpm, kq P OrclpzQ, xq, |Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą Lu
“tχpzQ, i, j, sQq ě 1u (XI.17)
to be the event that there exists codewords that can be perturbed by sQ to give a large list-size. The error event ELD is
defined as
ELD –
ď
zQ
ď
i
ď
j
ď
sQ
ELDpzQ, i, j, sQq. (XI.18)
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D. The probability of myopic list-decoding error – proof of Theorem IX.5
We now prove Theorem IX.5 by upper bounding the probability that an error occurs in myopic list-decoding. Let
Lpkqpxpmq, sQq– tw P r2nRs : xpw, kq P Bnpxpm, kq ` sQ,
?
nN `anδSq X Cpkqu.
We can decompose the failure probability in the following manner using Lemma VI.2.
P
´
Ds P Bnp0,?nNq, |tpm,kq P Orclpz,xq : |Lpkqpxpmq, sq| ą Lu| ą 2np´hp,τ,δS ,δZq{2q
¯
ďP
´
DsQ P S, |tpm,kq P OrclpzQ,xq : |Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą Lu| ą 2np´hp,τ,δS ,δZq{2q
¯
ďP pEatyp Y Estr Y Eorcl Y ELDq
“P
¨˝
Eatyp Y
ď
i
Estrpiq Y Eorcl Y
ď
zQ
ď
i
ď
j
ď
sQ
ELDpzQ, i, j, sQq‚˛
ď1´ p1´ PpEatypqq
¨
˜
1´
ÿ
i
PpEstrpiq|Ecatypq
¸
¨ p1´ PpEorcl|Ecatyp X Ecstrqq
¨
¨˝
1´
ÿ
zQ
ÿ
i
ÿ
j
ÿ
sQ
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ecatyp X Ecstr X Ecorclq‚˛.
(XI.19)
It is therefore sufficient to show that each of the error terms is vanishing in n.
The analysis of Eatyp, Estr and Eorcl follows from somewhat standard concentration inequalities which are formally justified
in Section XI-E, Section XI-F and Section XI-G, respectively. Notice that in the analysis of Estr, James is said to be sufficiently
myopic if, given his observation z, his uncertainty set, i.e., any strip Strn´1pz, iq, contains at least exponentially many
codewords. This is guaranteed if R`Rkey ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
.
Much of the complication of our work is devoted to the analysis of ELDpzQ, i, j, sQq. We further factorize it into sub-events
and treat them separately. Define E – Eatyp Y Estr Y Eorcl. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. We are able to show that
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ecq ď2´Ωpn3q,
which allows us to take a union bound over exponentially many objects. To this end, we need to further decompose the error
event ELDpzQ, i, j, sQq in a careful manner.
Since the codewords all lie on a sphere, the effective decoding region is equal to Bpxpm,kq`sQ,
?
nN`?nδSqXSp0,
?
nP q.
We will first show in Lemma XI.29 that for most codewords in the oracle-given set, the area of the effective decoding region
under any fixed sQ is not too large. The list-size for the remaining codewords can be controlled using two-step list-decoding
argument and grid argument in Lemma XI.31. Specifically,
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ecq ď PpEsQ |Ecq ` PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ec X EcsQq.
We first compute the explicit value of the typical volume of list-decoding region. Using Chernoff’s bound, we show in Lemma
XI.30 that PpEsQ |Ecq ď 2´Ωpn3q. The second term can be shown to also be 2´Ωpn3q. This implies that for any given attack
vector sQ, the probability that sQ can force a large list-size for any codewords is superexponentially small. To complete the
proof, we take a union bound over zQ, the strips, the OGSs and sQ.
The whole bounding procedure (including myopic list-decoding in this section and unique decoding in Section XII) is
depicted in Figure 25.
E. Event Eatyp: Atypical behaviours of James’ observation
From Fact VI.4, we know the probability that sz,x are not jointly typical vanishes as n Ñ 8. Specifically, the AWGN to
James has norm concentrating around
?
nσ2 and is appproximately orthogonal to x.
PpEatyp1q “ Pp}sz}2 R
a
nσ2p1˘ qq ď 2 expp´2n{4q— 2´f1pqn.
PpEatyp2q “Pp| cosp=x,sz q| ě q
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James’ observation behaves atypically
The 𝑖-th strip contains < 23𝜖𝑛 codewords
Union bound
over strips
The transmitted codeword belongs to the last OGS
Conditioned on good events,
𝐱 in an OGS has large list-size under 
Decoding region of 𝐱 in 
an OGS has atypical area
Linearity of expectation
Bayes theorem
Bayes theorem
Chernoff bound
Any strip contains < 23𝜖𝑛 codewords
List-decodable with poly(n) list-size w.h.p.
Myopic list-decoding
Blob list-decoding
Reverse list-decoding
Type I error: confusing codewords are outside OGS
Blob list-decoding
Reverse list-decoding
Type II error: confusing codewords come from OGS
Grid argument
Unique decoding w.h.p.
Unique decoding
For fixsed , too many codewords in OGS have large list-size
Too many codewords in OGS have large list-size
Union bound over 𝐳’s, strips, OGSs, 𝐬’s
Fig. 25: A flow-chart describing the procedure of bounding error probability. Some notation is simplified for ease of drawing.
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“P
ˆˇˇˇˇ xx, szy
}x}2}sz}2
ˇˇˇˇ
ě 
˙
“P
ˆˇˇˇˇxe1, szy
}sz}2
ˇˇˇˇ
ě 
˙
(XI.20)
“Pp|sz1| ě }sz}2q
ďPp|sz1| ě }sz}2, }sz}2 P
a
nσ2p1˘ qq ` Pp}sz}2 R
a
nσ2p1˘ qq
ďPp|sz1| ě 
a
nσ2p1´ qq ` Pp}sz}2 R
a
nσ2p1˘ qq
ď2 expp´2p1´ qn{2q ` 2´f1pqn
—2´f2pqn,
where in Equation XI.20, without loss of generality, we assume x{}x}2 “ e1, where e1 “ p1, 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , 0qT is the unit vector
along the first dimension. Notice that
}z}22 “ }x` sz}22 “ }x}22 ` }sz}22 ` 2xx, szy.
Choose the smallest 1 – 1pq that satisfies npP ` σ2qp1˘ q Ă nP ` nσ2p1˘ 1q ˘ 2
?
nP
a
nσ2p1` 1q1. We can also
concentrate James’ observation
PpEatyp3q “Pp}z}22 R npP ` σ2qp1˘ qq
ďPp}z}22 R nP ` nσ2p1˘ 1q ˘
?
nP
a
nσ2p1` 1q1q
ďPp}sz}22 R nσ2p1˘ 1qq ` Pp|xx, szy| ě
?
nP
a
nσ2p1` 1q1q
“Pp}sz}22 R nσ2p1˘ 1qq ` Pp|xx, szy| ě
?
nP
a
nσ2p1` 1q1, }sz}22 P nσ2p1˘ 1qq
` Pp|xx, szy| ě
?
nP
a
nσ2p1` 1q1, }sz}22 R nσ2p1˘ 1qq
ď2Pp}sz}22 R nσ2p1˘ 1qq ` Pp|xx, szy| ě }x}2}sz}21q
ď2 ¨ 2´f1p1qn ` 2´f2p1qn
—2´f3pqn.
Therefore,
PpEatypq ď PpEatyp1q ` PpEatyp2q ` PpEatyp3q ď 2´f1pqn ` 2´f2pqn ` 2´f3pqn — 2´nfatyppq,
where fatyppq is positive as long as  ą 0 and limÓ0 fatyppq “ 0.
F. Event Estr: Number and distribution of codewords in strips: Exponential behaviour and quasi-uniformity
The intersection of ShnpzQ,
a
nσ2p1˘ qq with Sn´1p0,?nP q forms a thick strip Strn´1pzQq– Ťi Strn´1pzQ, iq, i.e.,
the union of all thin strips, which we study next. For ease of incoming calculations, let us first translate the slacks in the
distances from the strips to zQ, i.e.,  and δ as afore-defined, to slacks in the radii
?
nrstr of strips, i.e, ρ and τ , respectively.
Recall that the set of strips is defined as follows
Strn´1pzQ, iq “ Sn´1p0,
?
nP q X ShnpzQ,
a
nσ2p1` pi´ 1qδq,anσ2p1` iδqq, @i P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu. (XI.21)
Now we write it in a slightly different form
Strn´1pzQ, iq “ Capn´1p¨,
a
nrstrp1` iτq,
?
nP qzCapn´1p¨,anrstrp1` pi´ 1qτq,?nP q, @i P t´ρ{τ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ρ{τu.
(XI.22)
Note that ρ{τ “ {δ. Define di –
a
nσ2p1` iδq and rstr,i –
a
nrstrp1` iτq, for any i P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu. Then by
Heron’s formula,
1
2
}zQ}2rstr,i “
b
sps´ diqps´ }zQ}2qps´
?
nP q,
where
s “ 1
2
pdi ` }zQ}2 `
?
nP q.
Solving the equation, we have
rstr,i “ 2}zQ}2
b
sps´ diqps´ }zQ}2qps´
?
nP q.
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It follows that ρ and τ only differ by a constant factor from  and δ, respectively.
As mentioned, codewords are almost uniformly distributed in the strip from James’ point of view. Given z, we now
characterize the quasi-uniformity in terms of τ . Define quasi-uniformity factor
∆pτq “ sup
zPShnp0,
?
npP`σ2qp1˘qq
max
i
sup
xp1q,xp2qPStrn´1pzQ,iq
px|zpxp1q|zQq
px|zpxp2q|zQq . (XI.23)
Lemma XI.24 (Quasi-uniformity). For appropriate choices of the small constant ρ and τ “ Θpplog nq{nq, conditioned on
Ecatyp, we have ∆pτq “ Oppolypnqq.
Proof. As shown in Figure 26, obviously, for fixed z and i, the inner supremum is achieved by a point x´ on the upper boundary
(closer to z) of the strip and a point x` on the lower boundary (further from z) of the strip. Calculations in Appendix E show
that
sup
xp1q,xp2qPStrn´1pz,iq
px|zpxp1q|zQq
px|zpxp2q|zQq “ exp
˜
}z}2 `?nδZ
σ2
2nrstrτa
npP ´ r´q `
a
npP ´ r`q
¸
.
Then, conditioned on Ecatyp, the quasi-uniformity factor is upper bounded by
∆pτq ď sup
zPShnp0,
?
npP`σ2qp1˘qq
max
i
exp
˜
}z}2 `?nδZ
σ2
2nrstrτa
npP ´ r´q `
a
npP ´ r`q
¸
ď exp
˜a
npP ` σ2qp1` q ` ?nδZ
σ2
2nrstrτa
npP ´ rstrp1´ τqq `
a
npP ´ rstrp1` τqq
¸
ď exp
¨˝apP ` σ2qp1` q ` ?δZ
σ2
2nτ Pσ
2p1`q
pP`σ2qp1´qb
P ´ Pσ2p1`qp1´τqpP`σ2qp1´q `
b
P ´ Pσ2p1`qp1`τqpP`σ2qp1´q
‚˛, (XI.25)
where r´ “ rstrp1 ´ τq and r` “ rstrp1 ` τq. Eqn. XI.25 follows since the bound is increasing in rstr. Bounds on rstr can
be obtained as follows. In the triangle ∆xzO, we have
1
2
}z}2?nrstr “ 1
2
}x}2}sz} sinp=x,sz q,
which implies
rstr “
P }sz}2p1´ cosp=x,sz q2q
}z}2 .
Conditioned on Ecatyp,
Pσ2p1´ q
pP ` σ2qp1´ q ď rstr ď
Pσ2p1` q
Pσ2p1´ q . (XI.26)
We have ∆pτq “ Oppolypnqq by taking τ “ Θpplog nq{nq.
Next, we show that if the codebook rate is large enough, then with high probability the strip will contain exponentially
many codewords.
Lemma XI.27 (Exponentially many codewords in strips). Let Rcode ą 12 log
`
1` Pσ2
˘
. Then, from James’ perspective, he is
confused with exponentially many codewords in the strip with probability doubly exponentially close to one.
PpEstr|Ecatypq “P
˜ď
i
Estrpiq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ecatyp
¸
“P
´
Di, |MstrpzQ, iq| ď 23n
ˇˇˇ
Ecatyp
¯
“P
´
Di, |Strn´1pzQ, iq X C| ď 23n
ˇˇˇ
Ecatyp
¯
ď2´2Ωpnq .
Remark XI.28. Note that James uncertainty set contains codewords from the whole codebook C, not only from Cpkq for some
particular k, since the shared key is assumed to be kept secret from James.
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Fig. 26: For any James’ observation z, a thin strip containing the transmitted codeword x is constructed on the coding sphere
Sn´1p0,?nP q. Typically, the geometry is shown in above figure. From James’ perspective, given z, codewords in the strip
are approximately equally likely to be transmitted by Alice. The quasi-uniformity is defined as the maximum deviation of
probability of codewords in the strip. Notice that any codeword at the same latitude has exactly the same probability. Codewords
on the upper (lower) boundary of the strip, say x´ (x`), are most (least) likely in the strip to be transmitted. For small enough
(Opplog nq{nq) thickness of the strip, the quasi-uniformity factor is a polynomial in n.
Proof. First, in Appendix F, we show that, for any typical zQ and i,
E
´
|Strn´1pzQ, iq X C|
ˇˇˇ
Ecatyp
¯
ě 24n.
Note that the random variable |Strn´1pzQ, iq X C| can be written as a sum of a bunch of independent indicator variables
|Strn´1pzQ, iq X C| “
ÿ
pm,kqPr2npR`Rkeyqs
1txpm,kqPStrn´1pzQ,iqu,
or in slightly different notation
|MstrpzQ, iq| “
ÿ
pm,kqPr2npR`Rkeyqs
1tpm,kqPMstrpzQ,iqu.
Thus by Chernoff bound,
PpEstrpiq|Ecatypq “ Pp|Strn´1pzQ, iq X C| ď 23n|Ecatypq ď 2´2
Ωpnq
.
Note that there are at most 2ρ{τ “ Opn{ log nq many i’s. Lemma XI.27 is then obtained by taking a union bound over all
i’s.
G. Event Eorcl: Transmitted codeword falls into the last block
Conditioned on z and the OGS, the transmitted codeword is quasi-uniformly distributed over the strip that the OGS lives
on. Given Ecatyp and Ecstr, there are at least 23n many codewords in each strip. Also, notice that each OGS (probably except
the last one) is of size 2n. Therefore, the probability that Eorcl occurs can be bounded as follows.
PpEorcl|Ecatyp X Ecorclq ď 1`∆pτq “
1
r|MstrpzQ, iq|{2ns∆pτq ď
1
23n{2n∆pτq “ 2
´2n∆pτq.
H. Event ELD: Existence of a “bad” attack vector
At first, we fix zQ P Z, i P t´{δ`1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu, j P r`s, sQ P S. We will show that the probability that the list-size is greater
than L is superexponentially small in n. We will finally use a quantization argument and take a union bound over zQ, i, j, sQ
to show that PpELD|Ecq “ op1q.
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For any pm,kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq, to prove that Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą L|Ecq is superexponentially decaying, we will find
the typical value of
?
nr, where r – rpm, sQq is the normalized radius of the list-decoding region Bnpxpm,kq` sQ,
?
nN `?
nδSqXSn´1p0,
?
nP q (which is nothing but a cap), and use this to obtain an upper bound on the probability that the list-size
is large.
Recall that the typical radius is defined as roptpsQq – Eprpm, sQqq. This will be obtained as the solution to an opti-
mization problem (XI.51) and actually corresponds to the worst-case s that James can choose for the given OGS. Recall that
ELD-radpm, sQq denotes the event that the the radius of the list-decoding region Bnpxpm,kq`sQ,
?
nN`?nδSqXSn´1p0,
?
nP q
is not typical, i.e. that r is much larger than ropt. In Section XI-I, we will show the following:
Lemma XI.29. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. There exists f11p, δSq satisfying f11p, δSq Ñ 0 as Ñ 0 such that for every pm, kq in
the OGS,
PpELD-radpm, sQq|Ecq “ P
´
rpm, sQq ą roptpsQqp1` f11p, δSqq
ˇˇˇ
Ec
¯
ď 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn,
where E “ Eatyp Y Estr Y Eorcl and f9p, η, δS , δZq can be taken as 32 by choosing proper η, δS and δZ .
Recall that EsQ is the event that the radius of the list-decoding region r is greater than roptp1`f11p, δSqq for more than n2
codewords in the OGS. Since codewords in OGS are quasi-uniformly distributed and independent, using Chernoff-type bound
similar to Lemma VI.6 and the above lemma, we get that
Lemma XI.30. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. Then
PpEsQ |Ecq “P
´
|tpm,kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq : rpm, sQq ą roptpsQqp1` f11p, δSqqu| ą n2
ˇˇˇ
Ec
¯
ďP
¨˝ ÿ
pm,kqPOrclpjqpzQ,iq
1ELD-radpm,sQq ą n2
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ Ec‚˛
ď2´Ωpn3q.
In Section XI-J, we will show the following:
Lemma XI.31. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. For any pm,kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq for which r is typical, we have
Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą L|rEcq ď 2´Ωpn3q,
where L is set to be 3n2 and rE denotes E Y EsQ .
Lemmas XI.29 and XI.31 allow us to conclude that the probability that there exist codewords with list-size greater than L
is superexponentially small.
Lemma XI.32. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. Then
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ecq ď2´Ωpn3q.
Proof. Using Lemma VI.2 we obtain:
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|Ecq ďPpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|rEcq ` PpEsQ |Ecq.
The first term is superexponentially small by Lemma XI.31 and union bound.
PpELDpzQ, i, j, sQq|rEcq “PpχpzQ, i, j, sQq ě 1|rEcq
“PpDpm,kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq, |Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą L|rEcq
ď2n2´Ωpn3q
“2´Ωpn3q.
The second term is bounded by Lemma XI.29. This finishes the proof of Lemma XI.32.
There are at most 2Opnq many zQ’s in the covering Z of z’s. For each zQ, there are at most 2{δ “ Θpn{ log nq strips.
For fixed zQ and i, a loose upper bound on the number of oracle-given sets in the strip Strn´1pzQ, iq is 2npRcode´q. We are
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required to quantize s using a finite covering of Bnp0,?nNq. The steps mimic the proof of Lemma C.1, and we omit the
details. The argument for PpELD|Ecq “ op1q follows by taking a union bound over
2Opnq ¨Θpn{ log nq ¨ 2npRcode´q ¨ 2Opnq “ 2Opnq
many configurations of the four-tuple zQ, i, j and sQ. This completes the basic ingredients needed to obtain Theorem IX.5.
All that remains is to prove Lemma XI.29 and Lemma XI.31.
I. Proof of Lemma XI.29
In this section, we will upper bound the average area of the list-decoding region over James’ uncertainty in the OGS, and
show that with high probability it will not exceed the typical value largely.
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the geometry. Let x be quasi-uniformly distributed over the strip Strn´1pzQ, iq. For
reasons that will be clear in the subsequent calculations, we decompose x and sQ into sums of vectors parallel and orthogonal
to zQ,
x “ xQ} ` xQK, sQ “ sQ} ` sQK,
where e} denotes the unit vector along zQ and
xQ
} – ?nαxe}, xQK –
a
nβxe
K,
sQ
} – ´?nαse}, sQK – ?nβsesK,?
nαx “ xx,zQy}zQ}2 , ´
?
nαs “ xsQ,zQy}zQ}2 ,
s, and thus sQ, should satisfy James’ power constraint, i.e, αs ` βs ď N .
This decomposition will bring us analytic ease to compute the list-size, which is equivalent to computing the radius
?
nr
of the myopic list-decoding region. It is noted that, for any pm, kq P OrclpjqpzQ, iq, the list-decoding region of xpm, kq under
sQ is nothing but a cap
BnpyQ,
?
nN `anδSq X Sn´1p0,?nP q
“Bnpxpm,kq ` sQ,
?
nN `anδSq X Sn´1p0,?nP q
“Capn´1p¨,?nr,?nP q,
where yQ – x` sQ.
Notice that, averaged over the codebook generation, eK is uniformly distributed9 over the unit ring Sn´2p0, 1q. We will use
Lemma VI.5 to bound the tail of inner product of xQK and zQ.
Heuristically, in expectation, without quantization, we can compute the scale of each component of x and sQ. A glimpse at
the geometry (shown in Figure 27) immediately gives us the following relations:
?
nαx?
nP
“
?
nPa
npP ` σ2q ùñ αx “
P 2
P ` σ2 , (XI.33)a
nβx?
nσ2
“
?
nPa
npP ` σ2q ùñ βx “
Pσ2
P ` σ2 , (XI.34)
both of which follow from similarity of triangles. In fact, the lengths of both components are well concentrated. For any
0 ă η ă 1, we have
P
ˆ
αx R P
2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
“P
˜ xx, zQy
}zQ}2 R
c
n
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
“P
˜
xx, zQy R
c
n
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq}zQ}2
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
ďP
˜
xx, zQy R
c
n
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηqp}z}2 ¯
a
nδZq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
9Technically speaking, this is indeed the case only when we decompose x with respect to z, but not its quantization zQ. It is not exactly, yet still
approximately true when we take the quantization zQ of z. This quantization error will be taken into account via Lemma XI.45.
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Fig. 27: In expectation, the noise to James sz is orthogonal to the codeword x and of length
?
nσ2. Fix a legitimate attack
vector s and decompose x and s into sums of components orthogonal and parallel to James’ observation z. Each component
in above figure can be concentrated and is robust to quantization errors.
ďP
˜
xx, zQy R
c
n
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηqp
a
npP ` σ2qp1¯ q ¯anδZq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
(XI.35)
ďPpxx, zQy R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq|Ecq
—2´f5p,η,δZqn, (XI.36)
where Inequality XI.35 follows from that }z}2 P
a
npP ` σ2qp1˘ q since we condition on Ec, and Inequality ?? follows
from the following calculations.
Ppxx, zQy R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq|Ecq
“Ppxx, z ` zey R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq|Ecq (XI.37)
“Ppxx, zy ` xx, zey R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq|Ecq
ďPpxx, zy R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq ¯ }x}2}ze}2|Ecq (XI.38)
ďPpxx, zy R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZqq ¯ n
a
PδZ |Ecq
“Ppxx,x` szy R nP p1˘ f4p, η, δZq ¯
a
PδZq|Ecq
ďPpxx, szy ` }x}22 R nP p1˘ f 14p, η, δZqq|Ecq
“Pp|xx, szy| ą nPf 14p, η, δZq|Ecq
“P
˜
|xe1, eszy| ą nPf
1
4p, η, δZq?
nP }sz}2
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
ďP
˜
|xe1, eszy| ą nPf
1
4p, η, δZq?
nP
a
nσ2p1` q
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ec
¸
(XI.39)
ď2´
Pf 14p,η,δZ q2
2σ2p1`q pn´1q (XI.40)
—2´nf5p,η,δZq, (XI.41)
where in the above chain of (in)equalities, we use the following facts.
1) In Equation XI.37, we write zQ “ z ` ze, where ze denotes the decomposition error which has norm at most ?nδZ by
the choice of the covering Z .
2) Inequality XI.38 follows from Cauchy–Schwarz inequality ´}x}2}ze}2 ď xx, zey ď }x}2}ze}2.
3) In Inequality XI.39, }sz}2 P
a
nσ2p1˘ q since we condition on Ec.
4) Inequality XI.40 is a straightforward application of Lemma VI.5.
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It follows that with probability at least 1´ 2´f5p,η,δZqn the scale of the perpendicular component is also concentrated around
its expected value,
βx P P ´ P
2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq “
P 2
P ` σ2 p1¯ η{σ
2q— P
2
P ` σ2 p1¯ η1q,
All the above concentration is over the randomness in the channel between Alice and James and the codebook generation.
We are now ready to compute the expected value of the radius
?
nr of the list-decoding region and concentrate it. To this
end, let us first do some rough calculations to see what we should aim for. Loosely speaking, we expect the following quantity
xx,´sQy “x?nαxe} `
a
nβxe
K,
?
nαse
} ´anβsesKy
“x?nαxe},?nαse}y ´ x
a
nβxe
K,
a
nβses
Ky (XI.42)
“n?αxαs ´ n
a
βxβsxeK, esKy
to satisfy
Epxx,´sQyq « nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 . (XI.43)
This is because:
1) In Equation XI.42, by decomposition, crossing terms vanish.
2) When there is no quantization error in z, it holds that EpxeK, esKyq “ 0 as eK is isotropically distributed on a ring
Sn´2p0, 1q. By previous heuristic calculations (see Equation XI.33), we expect αx to be roughly P 2P`σ2 .
These indicate that Equation XI.43 should be reasonably correct modulo some technicalities.
Remark XI.44. Notice that, for a fixed βx, we actually know exactly the distribution of x?nβxeK,?nβsesKy. Indeed, in Rn,
given a fixed unit vector e and a random unit vector e isotropically distributed on the unit sphere Sn´1p0, 1q, |xe,ey|2`12 follows
Beta distribution Beta
`
n´1
2 ,
n´1
2
˘
. Plugging this into our calculation, indeed, we get that x?nβxeK,?nβsesKy has mean 0.
However, this result does not bring us any analytic advantage. Rather, in the analysis, when caring about concentration, we
use Lemma VI.5 to approximate the tail of this distribution.
Although given z, eK is perfectly isotropic on the unit ring Sn´2p0, 1q, it is not exactly the case when we are working
with zQ. It is, however, probably approximately correct (PAC). Specifically, this issue can be fixed by the following lemma.
As shown in Figure 28b, recall that we denote by x “ xQ} ` xQK the decomposition with respect to zQ. Also, denote by
x “ x} ` xK the decomposition with respect to z. Define the error vectors as xe – xQK ´ xK and se – sQK ´ sK.
Lemma XI.45. Fix ζ ą 0. Also fix z and s, and thereby zQ and sQ. Let ζ 1 – ζ ´?PδS ´
b
NPδZpP`σ2qp1´q ´
b
PδSδZpP`σ2qp1´q .
Then
Pp|xxQK, sQKy| ě nζ|Ecq ď 2´ pn´2qζ
12
2NP .
Proof. We write
Pp|xxQK, sQKy| ě nζ|Ecq
“Pp|xxK ` xe, sK ` sey| ě nζ|Ecq
ďPp|xxK, sKy| ` |xxK, sey| ` |xxe, sKy| ` |xxe, sey| ě nζ|Ecq
ďPp|xxK, sKy| ` }xK}2}se}2 ` }xe}2}sK}2 ` }xe}2}se}2 ě nζ|Ecq
ďPp|xxK, sKy| ` n
a
PδS `
?
nN}xe}2 `
a
nδS}xe}2 ě nζ|Ecq.
It then suffices to upper bound }xe}2. Write zQ “ z ` ze where ze denotes the quantization error for z with respect to the
covering Z . As ze is at most
?
nδZ , for maximum θ shown in Figure 28a, we have sinpθq “ }ze}2}z}2 ď
?
nδZ
}z}2 . Notice that
=QAP “ =QBP “ =QOP {2 “ θ. Consider the triangle ∆QOP . We have |QP |{2|QO| “
}xe}2{2
}x}2{2 “ sinpθq ď
?
nδZ
}z}2 , i.e.,
}xe}2 ď
?
nP?
npP`σ2qp1´q
?
nδZ “
b
nPδZpP`σ2qp1´q . Now Lemma VI.5 can be applied.
Pp|xxQK, sQKy| ě nζq
ďP
˜
|xxK, sKy| ě nζ ´ naPδS ´ n
d
NPδZ
pP ` σ2qp1´ q ´ n
d
PδSδZ
pP ` σ2qp1´ q
¸
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(a) For the ease of union bounds over
James’ observation, any given z is quan-
tized to zQ using the
?
nδZ -net Z . The
quantization error introduced by covering
will have an impact on the rest of the anal-
ysis. We measure this using the angular
distance between z and zQ. The maximum
angle θ is given by the geometry shown
in the above figure. θ is small given a
typical z due to the covering property of
Z . We will keep track how errors θ are
propagated.
(b) Ideally we would like to decompose everything into direc-
tions along and perpendicular to z. However, what we really
work with is the quantized version zQ of z. Hence some errors
are incurred in the the parallel and perpendicular components of
the vectors we are interested in. A comparison of the geometry
of decomposition with respect to zQ and z is shown in the above
figure. In particular, the error in the perpendicular component
xK of x stemming from the quantization of z can be bounded
in terms of the angular quantization error θ.
Fig. 28: The geometry of the propagation of the quantization error of z.
ď2´
pn´2qn2ζ12
2}xK}22}sK}22
ď2´ pn´2qζ
12
2NP .
This completes the proof for Lemma XI.45.
Now we give a concentrated version of Equation XI.43.
P
ˆ
x´x, sQy R nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
(XI.46)
“P
ˆ
x?nαxe},?nαse}y ´ x
a
nβxe
K,
a
nβses
Ky R nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
“P
ˆ
x?nαxe},?nαse}y ´ x
a
nβxe
K,
a
nβses
Ky R nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q, αx P
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
` P
ˆ
x?nαxe},?nαse}y ´ x
a
nβxe
K,
a
nβses
Ky R nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q, αx R
P 2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
ďP
ˆ
xanβxeK,anβsesKy R nPc αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq ´ nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
(XI.47)
` P
ˆ
αx R P
2
P ` σ2 p1˘ ηq
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
. (XI.48)
By Eqn. XI.36, the second term XI.48 is at most 2´f5p,η,δZqn. The first term XI.47 can be bounded as follows.
P
ˆ
|xanβxeK,anβsesKy| ą nPc αs
P ` σ2 p
a
1` η `?1` q
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
ďPp|x
a
nβxe
K,
a
nβses
Ky| ą nf8p, τq|Ecq
“Pp|xxQK, sQKy| ě nf8p, ηq|Ecq
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ď2´ pn´2qf
1
8p,η,δS ,δZ q2
2NP , (XI.49)
where inequality XI.49 follows from Lemma XI.45 and f 18p, η, δS , δZq– f8p, ηq´
?
PδS ´
b
NPδZpP`σ2qp1´q ´
b
PδSδZpP`σ2qp1´q .
Thus combining bounds XI.36 and XI.49 on terms XI.48 and XI.47 respectively, the probability XI.46 is well bounded by
2´
pn´2qf 18p,η,δS ,δZ q
2NP ` 2´f5p,η,δZqn — 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn.
The above results allow us to compute the typical length of yQ under the translation of the prescribed sQ. We can do so
by writing the “angular correlation” between x and sQ in analytic and geometric ways separately. Specifically, it follows from
the above concentration result that with probability at least 1´ 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn,
cosp=´x,sQq “
x´x, sQy
}x}2}sQ}2 P
nP
b
αs
P`σ2 p1˘ q?
nP
?
nN
“
d
Pαs
NpP ` σ2q p1˘ q.
On the other hand, by law of cosines, we have (with probability one)
cosp=´x,sQq “
}x}22 ` }sQ}22 ´ }yQ}22
2}x}2}sQ}2 “
nP ` nN ´ }yQ}22
2
?
nP
?
nN
.
It immediately follows that
}yQ}22 “ npP `Nq ´ 2nP
c
αs
P ` σ2 p1˘ q,
with probability at least 1´ 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn.
Denote by
?
nr the radius of the intersection BnpyQ,
?
nN ` ?nδSq X Sn´1p0,
?
nP q. Staring at the triangle ∆OAO1
shown in Figure 29, we know that, with probability at least 1´ 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn,ˆ ?
nr?
nP
˙2
“ psinp=AOO1qq2 “ 1´ pcosp=AOO1qq2,
i.e.,
r
P
“1´
˜
nP ` }yQ}22 ´ p
?
nN `?nδSq2
2
?
nP }yQ}2
¸2
ùñ r “N ´ P
αs
P`σ2 p1˘ q ` f10p, δSq
P `N ´ 2P
b
αs
P`σ2 p1˘ q
P,
where f10p, δSq– ´ pδS`2
?
NδSq2
4P `
´
1´
b
αs
P`σ2 p1´ q
¯
pδS ` 2?NδSq. That is to say, we have
P
¨˝
r R N ´ P
αs
P`σ2
P `N ´ 2P
b
αs
P`σ2
P p1˘ f11p, δSqq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ Ec‚˛ď 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn. (XI.50)
From James’ perspective, he aims to maximize the above quantity to confuse Bob to the largest extent. He will take the
jamming strategy corresponding to the optimal solution of the following optimization problem. The average worst-case value
of r obtained in this manner is what we call ropt.
minαs
P`N´2P
b
αs
P`σ2
N´P αs
P`σ2
subject to 0 ď αs ď N
σ2
P ě 11´N{P ´ 1
P,N, σ2 ě 0
(XI.51)
Remark XI.52. Notice that the objective function of the above optimization problem XI.51 is essentially the same as that of
the optimization VIII.6 in the scale-and-babble converse argument under the map α ÞÑ
b
αs
P`σ2 .
Solving this optimization problem and combining it with Lemma XI.31 which will be proved in Section XI-J, we get that,
if the code operates at a rate
R ă
$&%
1
2 log
P
N — CLD,
1
1´N{P ´ 1 ď σ
2
P ď 1N{P ´ 1
1
2 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qpP`Nq´2P
?
NpP`σ2q
Nσ2
˙
— RLD,myop, σ
2
P ě max
!
1
1´N{P ´ 1, 1N{P ´ 1
) , (XI.53)
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Fig. 29: Fix a legitimate attack vector sQ. We compute the expected radius of the list-decoding region, which is the cap
Capn´1pyQ,?nr,
?
nP q “ Capn´1px` sQ,?nr,
?
nP q shown in above figure, over codewords in the strip.
then no matter towards which direction James is going to push the transmitted codeword, a vast majority (an exponentially
close to one fraction) of codewords in the strip have small list-size (at most a low-degree polynomial in n).
In conclusion,
P pr ą roptp1` f11p, δSq|Ecq ď 2´f9p,η,δS ,δZqn.
where ropt is the average list-decoding radius obtained by James choosing the worst-case attack vector minimizing the rate
corresponding to the optimization problem (XI.51). One can choose η, δS and δZ so that f9p, η, δS , δZq “ 32. This completes
the proof of Lemma XI.29.
J. Proof of Lemma XI.31
In this section, we will show that myopic list-decoding succeeds with high probability conditioned on everything behaves
typically (which is true as we have analyzed in previous sections).
Let ropt denote the optimal solution of the above optimization. In what follows, we will prove that the probability that there
are too many (more than L “ 3n2) codewords in the list-decoding region is super-exponentially small. According to where
the codewords in the list-decoding region come from, the list-decoding error can be divided into two types. If the confusing
codewords come from the OGS, then they are quasi-uniformly distributed on the strip that the OGS belongs to, given James
observation and extra information revealed to him. Otherwise, if the confusing codewords are outside the OGS, then they are
uniformly distributed by the codebook generation.
1) Confusing codewords in the list-decoding region come from OGS. We further subdivide these confusing codewords into
two types: those which have a typical r and those which do not.
‚ Confusing codeword has atypical r: Conditioned on EcsQ , there are at most n2 codewords with atypical r. The
distribution of these codewords is hard to obtain, and we will pessimistically assume that all these codewords are
included in the list.
‚ Confusing codeword has typical r: The codewords with a typical r are all independent but no longer uniformly
distributed over the strip given EcsQ . However, the distribution is almost uniform. For any set A Ă Rn, we have
Ppxpm,kq P A|EcsQ X Ecq ď P
pxpm,kq P A|Ecq
PpEcsQ |Ecq
“ Ppxpm,kq P A|Ecqp1` op1qq.
Therefore, this conditioning does not significantly affect our calculations. Conditioned on bad events aforementioned
not happening the average probability that a codeword falls into the list-decoding region is
Ppm1 P Lpkqpxpmq, sQq XOrclpzQ,xq|rEcq
ďAreapCap
n´1p¨,anroptp1` f11p, δSqq,?nP qq
AreapStrn´1pzQ, iqq ¨∆pτqp1` op1qq
41
“
d
roptp1` f11p, δSqq
rstr
2
n
´
´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
` 12 logp Prstr q`f11p,δSq
¯
¨∆pτqp1` op1qq
ď
gfferoptp1` f11p, δSqq
Pσ2p1´q
pP`σ2qp1`q
2
n
´
´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
` 12 logp1` Pσ2 q`2`f11p,δSq
¯
¨∆pτqp1` op1qq,
which is exponentially small. Then by similar calculations to Lemma VI.6, we have
Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQq XOrclpzQ,xq| ą 2n2|rEcq ď 2´Ωpn3q. (XI.54)
2) Confusing codewords in the list-decoding region do not belong to the OGS.
E
´
|Lpkqpxpmq, sQqzOrclpzQ,xq|
ˇˇˇ rEc¯
ďAreapCap
n´1p¨,anroptp1` f11p, δSqq,?nP qq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq 2
nRcode
“
d
P
roptp1` f11p, δSqq2
n
´
Rcode´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
`f11p,δSq
¯
,
which is exponentially small if Rcode is below the threshold. Then immediately by Lemma VI.6,
Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQqzOrclpzQ,xq| ą n2|rEcq ď 2´Ωpn3q. (XI.55)
Taking into account two types of error in Equation XI.54 and Equation XI.55, respectively, we get
Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQq| ą L|rEcq
ďPp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQq XOrclpzQ,xq| ą 2n2|rEcq
` Pp|Lpkqpxpmq, sQqzOrclpzQ,xq| ą n2|rEcq
ď2´Ωpn3q. (XI.56)
This completes the proof of Lemma XI.29.
In the following section, we will argue that Bob will enjoy a vanishing probability of error below the threshold given by
optimization XI.51, which matches the converse in Section VIII-A in the corresponding region.
XII. ACHIEVABILITY IN THE SUFFICIENTLY MYOPIC REGIME – FROM MYOPIC LIST-DECODING TO UNIQUE DECODING
We first sketch the roadmap to proving that Bob can uniquely decode m with high probability. From James’ point of view,
x is quasi-uniformly distributed over the strip. The probability of error is small if
‚ the total number of messages (call them confusing codewords) that can confuse any message in the OGS is small (say
polypnq) with probability super-exponentially close to one; and
‚ any message can only confuse a small number (say polypnq) of messages in the OGS (call them confused codewords)
with probability super-exponentially close to one.
The first statement follows from a blob list-decoding argument and second follows from a reverse list-decoding argument.
Technically, as we have seen in the analysis of myopic list-decoding error, we have to analyze the decoding error for two
cases – the case where the confusing codewords come from the OGS and the case where they are outside the OGS. Details
are elaborated in Section XII-A and Section XII-B.
A. Type I error
For type I error, confusing codewords come from r2nRszOrclpjqpzQ, iq. We will prove that there are at most polynomially
many (out of exponentially many) codewords in the OGS which can be erroneously decoded due to the confusion with some
message outside the OGS.
Recall the definition of E – EatypY EstrY Eorcl, which is the union of several error events. Conditioned on E , we have that
simultaneously z behaves typically, the strip contains a large number of codewords, and the transmitted codewords does not
fall into the last oracle-given set which can potentially have too small size.
Lemma XII.1.
P
´
DzQ, Di, Dj, DsQ, |tm P OrclpjqpzQ, iq : Dm1 P r2nRszOrclpjqpzQ, iq, xpm1q P Lpkqpxpmq, sQqu| ě n2
ˇˇˇ
Ec
¯
ď 2´Ωpn3q.
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Proof. We prove the lemma using a two-step list-decoding argument. Fix zQ, i, j and sQ. Notice that txpmq P Cpkq : m P
r2nRszOrclpjqpzQ, iqu are independently and uniformly distributed.
It is a folklore (Appendix C) in the literature that a spherical code C of rate 12 log PN´ are pP,N, rOp1{qq-list-decodable (with
exponential concentration), thus are also pP,N,Opn2qq-list-decodable (with super-exponential concentration by Lemma VI.6).
1) Myopic blob list-decoding: Let X psQq– txpm1, sQq : m1 P OrclpjqpzQ, iq, and r ą roptp1` f11pqqu be the set of all
codewords in the OGS having typical list-decoding region. It suffices to prove that a nonvanishing fraction of the codewords
in X psQq can with high probability be decoded uniquely for every sQ. Define
Blob “
ď
xPX psQq
Bnpx` sQ,
?
nN `anδSq.
If rE “ E Y EsQ , then the number of codewords in the blob is expected to be
E
´
|BlobX pCpkqzOrclpjqpzQ, iqq|
ˇˇˇ rEc¯
ďAreapCap
n´1p¨,anroptp1` f11p, δSqq,?nP qq2n
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq 2
nR
ďAreapS
n´1p¨,anroptp1` f11p, δSqqqq2n
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq 2
nR
“
a
nroptp1` f11p, δSqqn´1?
nP
n´1 2
n2nR
“
d
P
roptp1` f11p, δSqq2
n
´
R´ 12 log
´
P
roptp1`f11p,δS qq
¯
`
¯
ď
d
P
roptp1` f11p, δSqq2
n
´
R´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
`f11p,δSq`
¯
, (XII.2)
which is exponentially small. The last inequality XII.2 follows since logp1 ` xq ď x for x ď 1. Then by LemmaVI.6, the
actual number of codewords exceeds n2 with probability at most 2´Ωpn3q.
2) Reverse list-decoding: Conditioned on EsQ , the codewords in X psQq are independent but not uniformly distributed over
the strip. However, the distribution is almost uniform and does not affect our calculations except for adding a p1` op1qq term.
More precisely, for any set A Ă Rn, we have
Ppxpm,kq P A|EcsQq ď P
pxpm,kq P Aq
PpEsQq “ Ppxpm,kq P Aqp1` op1qq.
The expected number of codewords corresponding to messages in OGS translated by sQ lying in the ball Bn
`
xpm1q,?nN `?nδS
˘
for any m1 P r2nRszOrclpjqpzQ, iq is
E
´
|Bnpxpm1q,?nN `anδSq X ptxpmqumPOrclpjqpzQ,iq ` sQq|ˇˇˇ rEc¯
“E
´
|Bnpxpm1q ´ sQ,
?
nN `anδSq X txpmqumPOrclpjqpzQ,iq|ˇˇˇ rEc¯
ď AreapS
n´1p¨,?nN `?nδSqq
AreapStrn´1pO1´ , O1` ,?nr´,?nr`qq2
np1` op1qq
“ AreapS
n´1p¨,?nN `?nδSqq
AreapCapn´1pO1` ,?nr`,
?
nP qq ´AreapCapn´1pO1´ ,?nr´,
?
nP qq2
np1` op1qq
ď AreapS
n´1p¨,?nN `?nδSqq
VolpBn´1pO1` ,?nr`qq ´AreapSn´1pO1´ ,?nr´qq2
np1` op1qq
ď
c
N
rstr
2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log
ˆ
P
N`δS`2
?
NδS
˙
` 12 logp Prstr q`
˙
p1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
“
c
N
rstr
2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log PN´ 12 log
ˆ
1´ δS`2
?
NδS
N`δS`2
?
NδS
˙
` 12 logp Prstr q`
˙
p1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
ď
c
N
rstr
2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log PN` 12 logp Prstr q`2 δS`2
?
NδS
N`δS`2
?
NδS
`
˙
p1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq (XII.3)
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ď
d
NpP ` σ2qp1` q
Pσ2p1´ q 2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log PN` 12 logp1` Pσ2 q`2 δS`2
?
NδS
N`δS`2
?
NδS
`3
˙
p1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq ,
where in Eqn. XII.3 we use logp1´ xq ě ´2x for small enough x ą 0. The above quantity is exponentially small according
to the sufficient myopicity assumption. Thus the actual number is at most n2 with probability at least 1´ 2´Ωpn3q.
3) Union bound: By Section XII-A1 and Section XII-A2, for any zQ, i, j and sQ, there are at most n2 messages
from OrclpjqpzQ, iq satisfying the condition in the lemma with probability at most 2´Ωpn3q. Finally, a union bound over
all assumptions we have made completes the proof.
B. Type II error
For type II error, confusing codewords come from OrclpjqpzQ, iq. We will prove that there are at most polynomially many
codewords which are erroneously decoded due to confusion with another message in the same OGS. Once again we will only
analyze the probability of error only for codewords having typical list-decoding volume.
Lemma XII.4.
P
ˆ
DzQ, Di, Dj, DsQ, |tm P OrclpjqpzQ, iq : Dm1 P OrclpjqpzQ, iqztmu, xpm1q P Lpkqpxpmq, sQqu| ě polypnq
2n{2
ˇˇˇˇ
Ec
˙
ď 2´Ωpnq.
Proof. Notice that for different m P OrclpjqpzQ, iq, the events tDm1 P r2nRszOrclpjqpzQ, iq, xpm1q P Bnpxpmq` sQ,
?
nN `?
nδSqu are not independent. This issue is resolved by arranging messages in OGS into a 2n{2 ˆ 2n{2 square matrix M
lexicographically and applying blob list-decoding and reverse list-decoding to any row or column, denoted R, of M. Again,
using Lemma VI.6, it suffices to bound the expected blob list-size and reverse list-size from above by some exponentially
small quantity.
1) Blob list-decoding: The expected number of codewords in the intersection of the blob and the codewords corresponding
to the OGS is
E
´
|BlobX pOrclpjqpzQ, iqzRq|
ˇˇˇ rEc¯
ďAreapCap
n´1p¨,anroptp1` f11p, δSqq,?nP qq2n
AreapStrn´1pO1´ , O1` ,?nr´,?nr`qq 2
n{2∆pτqp1` op1qq
ď
d
roptp1` f11p, δSqq
rstr
2
n
´
´ 12 log
´
P
roptp1`f11p,δS qq
¯
` 12 logp Prstr q`3{2
¯
∆pτqp1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
ď
d
roptp1` f11p, δSqq
rstr
2
n
´
´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
` 12 logp Prstr q`f11p,δSq`3{2
¯
∆pτqp1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
ď
gfferoptp1` f11p, δSqq
Pσ2p1´q
pP`σ2qp1`q
2
n
´
´ 12 log
´
P
ropt
¯
` 12 logp1` Pσ2 q`f11p,δSq`7{2
¯
∆pτqp1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq .
2) Reverse list-decoding: The expected number of messages in the row (column) which can be confused by a single message
is
E
´
|Bnpxpm1q,?nN `anδSq X ptxpmqumPR ` sQq|ˇˇˇ rEc¯
“E
´
|Bnpxpm1q ´ sQ,
?
nN `anδSq X txpmqumPR|ˇˇˇ rEc¯
ď AreapS
n´1p¨,?nN `?nδSqq
AreapStrn´1pO1´ , O1` ,?nr´,?nr`qq2
n{2∆pτqp1` op1qq
ď
c
N
rstr
2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log PN` 12 logp Prstr q`2 δS`2
?
NδS
N`δS`2
?
NδS
`{2
˙
∆pτqp1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
ď
d
NpP ` σ2qp1` q
Pσ2p1´ q 2
n
ˆ
´ 12 log PN` 12 logp1` Pσ2 q`2 δS`2
?
NδS
N`δS`2
?
NδS
`5{2
˙
∆pτqp1` op1qq
2pn´1q 12 logp1`τq´Θplognq ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq .
3) Grid argument: By Section XII-B1 and Section XII-B2, for any zQ, i, j, sQ and R, there are at most n2 ¨ n2 “ n4
messages satisfying the condition in the lemma. Thus there are at most 2 ¨ 2n{2 ¨n4 such “bad” messages in M, i.e., the OGS.
A union bound over zQ, i, j and sQ completes the proof.
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XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS/FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this work, we studied the capacity of a myopic adversarial channel with quadratic constraints. We did so for different
amounts of common randomness, and were able to find a complete characterization for certain regimes of the noise-to-signal
ratios of Bob and James.
1) For different regimes of the NSRs (Figs. 7, 6, 4, and 5), we were able to characterize the capacity in the red, blue and
grey regions. We only have nonmatching upper and lower bounds on the capacity in the green and white regions.
2) We also derived a myopic list-decoding result in the general case when Alice and Bob share a linear amount of common
randomness. We believe that this is a useful technique that is worth exploring for general channels.
3) When Alice uses a deterministic encoder, we believe that an improved converse using linear programming-type bounds
might be obtained in the green and white regions.
4) The z-aware symmetrization argument could also be extended to obtain Plotkin-type upper bounds on the rate in the green
and white regions.
5) We also believe that superposition codes could be used to obtain improved achievability results in the green and white
regions for the case when there is no common randomness. In particular, we feel that rates exceeding RGV should be
achievable using superposition codes in the green and white regions.
6) A natural problem is to find the minimum amount of common randomness required to achieve the capacity in Fig. 2. We
know for certain values of the NSRs, this is achievable with no common randomness (blue and red regions in Fig. 7).
Even Θplog nq bits is sufficient to achieve RLD in the entire red region in Fig. 2, while the blue region can be expanded
with increasing amounts (Ωpnq bits) of shared secret key. A lower bound on nkey needed to achieve capacity along the
lines of [27] would be of interest.
7) In this article, we studied the impact of an adversary who has noncausal access to a noisy version of the transmitted
signal. However, in reality, James can only choose his attack vector based on a causal observation of the transmission.
Li et al. [26] have some recent results for the quadratically constrained adversarial channel where the jammer can choose
the ith symbol of his transmission based on the first i symbols of the transmitted codeword. An interesting direction is
to look at the impact of myopicity in this setup.
8) Our work was inspired by the study of the discrete myopic adversarial channel [20]. A part of their work involved studying
the capacity of a binary channel with a bit-flipping adversary who can flip at most np bits of the transmitted codeword
(for some 0 ă p ă 1{2). The adversary can choose his attack vector based on a noncausal observation of the output of a
binary symmetric channel with crossover probability q. Dey et al. [20] observed that if q ą p (sufficiently myopic), then
the adversary is essentially “blind,” i.e., the capacity is equal to 1 ´Hppq. This is what one would obtain when James
were oblivious to the transmitted codeword. In other words, as long as the channel from Alice to Bob has capacity greater
than that of the channel seen by James, damage that James can do is minimal. What we observe in the quadratically
constained case is slightly different. A sufficient condition for our results to go through is that the list-decoding capacity
for Bob be greater than the Shannon capacity for the channel seen by James. Even then, we can never hope to achieve
the oblivious capacity 12 logp1 ` PN q for any finite σ. What we can achieve is the myopic list-decoding capacity. In the
bit-flipping adversarial case, the list-decoding capacity is equal to the capacity of the channel with an oblivious adversary.
No amount of myopicity can let us obtain a higher list-decoding capacity. However, the two capacities are different in
the quadratically constrained scenario.
9) The difference between oblivious and list-decoding capacities might explain the gap between the upper and lower bounds
for general discrete myopic adversarial channels [20]. Our technique of using myopic list-decoding could potentially be
used to close this gap in certain regimes.
10) While the use of list-decoding as a technique for obtaining capacity of general AVCs is not new [24], we believe that
myopic list-decoding and reverse list-decoding can be generalized to arbitrary AVCs to obtain results even in the case
where the encoder-decoder pair do not share common randomness.
APPENDIX A
TABLE OF NOTATION
Symbol Description Value/Range
C Capacity lim supnÑ8Rpnq
C Codebook txpm, kq : m P r2nRs, k P r2nkey su Ď
Bnp0,?nP q
CAWGN Capacity of AWGN channels 12 log
`
1` PN
˘
Cpkq Codebook shared by Alice and Bob specified by
common randomness k
Cpkq “ txpm,kqu2nRm“1
E Shorthand notation for the union of several error
events
E “ Eatyp Y Estr Y Eorcl
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rE Shorthand notation for the union of several error
events
rE “ E Y EsQ
Eatyp The error event that James’ observation behaves
atypically
See Equation XI.9
ELD The error event that the any list-size is too large See Equation XI.18
Eorcl The error event that the transmitted codewords
falls into the last OGS in a strip
See Item XI-C
Estr The error event that there are not enough code-
words in a strip
See Equation XI.11
g Gaussian part of scale-and-babble attack g „ N p0, γ2Inq
k Common randomness shared by Alice and Bob k P t0, 1unkey
` Number of OGSs in a strip ` “ r|MstrpzQ, iq|{2ns
Lpkqpxpmq, sq List of xpmq ` s Bnpxpmq ` s,?nNq X Cpkq
Lpkqpxpmq, sQq List of xpmq ` sQ Bnpxpmq ` sQ,
?
nN `?nδSq X Cpkq
m Message held by Alice m „ Upr2nRsqpm Bob’s reconstruction pm P t0, 1unR
MstrpzQ, iq Set of codewords in Strn´1pzQ, iq zQ P Z, i P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu
N James’ power constraint, i.e., }s}2 ď
?
nN N P Rą0
n Blocklength/number of channel uses n P Zą0
nkey Amount of common randomness nkey “ nRkey
OrclpjqpzQ, iq Oracle-given set zQ P Z, i P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu, j P r`s
OrclpzQ,xq The oracle-given set containing the transmitted
x
OrclpzQ,xq “ OrclpιqpzQ, iq
P Alice’s power constraint, i.e., }x}2 ď
?
nP P P Rą0
R Rate log |C
pkq|
n P Rě0
Rcode Codebook rate Rcode “ R`Rkey “ log |C|n
RGV Gilbert–Varshamov bound, a lower bound on
capacity of quadratically constrained omniscient
adversarial channels
1
2 log
´
P 2
4NpP´Nq
¯
1tPě2Nu
Rkey Key rate Rkey “ nkey{n
RLD List-decoding capacity of quadratically con-
strained omniscient adversarial channels
1
2 log
P
N
RLP
Linear programming bound, an upper bound
on capacity of quadratically constrained
omniscient adversarial channels
pα logα´ β log βq1tPě2Nu,
where α “ P`2
?
NpP´Nq
4
?
NpP´Nq , β “
P´2
?
NpP´Nq
4
?
NpP´Nq
RLD,myop N/A 12 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qpP`Nq´2P
?
NpP`σ2q
Nσ2
˙
RRankin Rankin bound, an upper bound on capacity of
quadratically constrained omniscient adversarial
channels
1
2 log
`
P
2N
˘
1tPě2Nu
r Radius of list-decoding region Capn´1pxpmq `
sQ,
?
nrq “ Bnpxpmq` sQ,
?
nN `?nδSq for
m P OrclpzQ,xq
See Equation XI.50
ropt Optimal solution of optimization XI.51 See Equation XI.53
rstr Radius
?
nrstr of a strip rstr P Pσ2P`σ2 p1˘ q w.h.p.
S An optimal covering of Bnp0,?nP q with quan-
tization error at most
?
nδS
S “ tsQpiqu|S|i“1
Strn´1pzQ, iq Strip zQ P Z, i P t´{δ ` 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , {δu
s James’ attack vector s P Bnp0,?nNq
sQ Quantization of s sQ P S
sz AWGN to James sz „ N p0, σ2Inq
x Alice’s transmitted codeword x P C
y Bob’s observation y “ x` s P Bnp0,?nP `?nNq
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Z An optimal covering of
Shnp0,anpP ` σ2qp1˘ qq with quantization
error at most
?
nδZ
Z “ tzQpiqu|Z|i“1
z James’ noisy observation of x z “ x` sz P Rn
zQ Quantization of z zQ P Z
∆pτq Quasi-uniformity factor maxz maxi
maxxPStrn´1pzQ,iq px|zQpx|zQq
minxPStrn´1pzQ,iq px|zQpx|zQq
δ Thickness of a strip (See Equation XI.21) O
´
logn
n
¯
δS Quantization error parameter for s, i.e., for any
s P Bnp0,?nNq, there exists s1 P S, such that
}s´ s1}2 ď ?nδS
Op1q
δZ Quantization error parameter for s, i.e., for any
z P Shnp0,anpP ` σ2qp1˘ qq, there exists
z1 P Z , such that }z ´ z1}2 ď ?nδZ
Op1q
 N/A Op1q
ρ N/A Op1q
σ Standard deviation of channel noise to James
a
Varpszq
τ Thickness of a strip (See Equation XI.22) O
´
logn
n
¯
χpzQ, i, j, sQq Number of codewords in an OGS with large list-
size
See Equation XI.16
TABLE II: Table of notation.
APPENDIX B
STOCHASTIC VS. DETERMINISTIC ENCODING AGAINST AN OMNISCIENT ADVERSARY
Suppose we are given a sequence of pn,Rpnqstoch, P,Nq stochastic codes Cpnqstoch “ txpm, kq : m P r2nR
pnq
stochs, k P r2nRpnqkey su of
blocklength n, message rate Rpnqstoch, bounded private key rate R
pnq
key, subject to maximum power constraint P for Alice and
maximum power constraint N for James, with a deterministic decoder and average probability of error P pnqe,stoch
nÑ8Ñ 0. Fix any
n, we will turn Cpnqstoch into a pn,Rpnqdet , P,Nq deterministic code Cpnqdet . The deterministic decoder associated with Cpnqstoch partitions
Rn (the space that James’ observation y lives in) into 2nR
pnq
stoch cells tYpnqpmq Ă Rn : m P r2nRpnqstochsu, where Ypnqpmq – ty P
Bnp0,?nP `?nNq : Decpyq “ mu. Collect all “good” messages into Mpnq “ tm P r2nRpnqstochs : Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq ă 1u.
Assume that James’ jamming strategy is deterministic. For any good message m PMpnq, there must exist at least one “good”
codeword xpm, kq such that
px|mpxpm, kq|mq ą 0, and @s P Bnp0,
?
nNq, xpm, kq ` s P Ypnqpmq.
The second condition is equivalent to Bnpxpm, kq,?nNq Ď Ypnqpmq, i.e., James does not have enough power to push
xpm, kq outside Ypnqpmq. For any good message, take any one of good codewords and we get a deterministic codebook
Cpnqdet “ txpm, ¨q P Cpnqstoch : xpm, ¨q is good, m P r2nR
pnq
stochsu. By construction, this deterministic code with the same decoding
region partition restricted to the messages in Mpnq enjoys zero probability of error. We then argue that it has asymptotically
the same rate Rdet “ limnÑnRpnqstoch as Cpnqstoch.
P
pnq
e,stoch “
1
2nR
pnq
stoch
2nR
pnq
stochÿ
m“1
Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq
ě 1
2nR
pnq
stoch
|tm P r2nRpnqstochs : Pp pm ‰ m|m “ mq “ 1u|
“ 1
2nR
pnq
stoch
|pMpnqqc|
“Ppm RMpnqq Ñ 0.
Define e “ 1tmPMpnqu. We have
nR
pnq
stoch “Hpmq
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“Hpeq `Hpm|eq
“Hpeq ` Ppe “ 1qHpm|e “ 1q ` Ppe “ 0qHpm|e “ 0q
“Hpeq ` Ppm PMpnqqHpm|m PMpnqq ` Ppm RMpnqqHpm|m RMpnqq.
It follows that
R
pnq
det “
1
n
Hpm|m PMpnqq
“ 1
nPpm PMpnqq pnR
pnq
stoch ´Hpeq ´ Ppm RMpnqqHpm|m RMpnqqq
ě 1
nPpm PMpnqq pnR
pnq
stoch ´ 1´ P pnqe,stochnRpnqstochq
“ 1
1´ Ppm RMpnqq
ˆ
p1´ P pnqe,stochqRpnqstoch ´
1
n
˙
Ñ lim
nÑ8R
pnq
stoch.
APPENDIX C
QUADRATICALLY CONSTRAINED LIST-DECODING CAPACITY WITH AN OMNISCIENT ADVERSARY
A. Achievability.
We use a random spherical code, i.e., the 2nR, R “ 12 log PN ´  codewords C “ txpmqu2
nR
m“1 are chosen independently and
uniformly at random from the Euclidean sphere centered at the origin of radius
?
nP . Since James has a power constraint of?
nN , the received vector y “ x` s is guaranteed to lie within the shell Shnp0,?nP ˘?nNq. We will prove the following
result:
Lemma C.1. There exists a constant c ą 0 independent of n and , but possibly on P,N , and R, such that
P
ˆ
@y P Shnp0,?nP ˘?nNq, |Bnpy,?nNq X C| ă c1

log
1

˙
ě 1´ 2´Ωpnq.
Proof. Let L – c 1 log
1
 be the desired list-size, for some absolute constant c to be determined later. Define δ – N
2{8. At
first, we increase the list-decoding radius by a small amount
?
nδ. As we will see later, this will be helpful when we take a
union bound over possible y’s. We first show that for any fixed y, the probability (over the codebook) that there are more than
L codewords within a distance
?
nN `?nδ to y is sufficiently small.
Observe that |Bnpy,?nN `?nδq X C| “ |Capn´1py,?nN `?nδ,?nP q X C|. We claim that for any fixed y,
P
´
|Bnpy,?nN `?nδq X C| ą L
¯
ď c22´npL`1q{2. (C.2)
for some constant c2 independent of n and .
The maximal intersection of a ball Bnpy,?nN `?nδq and the Euclidean sphere Sn´1p0,?nP q is shown in Figure 30. It
can be seen that the corresponding y has length
a
npP ´Nq.
The probability of a codeword falling into the cap can be upper bounded by
p–P
´
x P Capn´1py,?nN `?nδ,?nP q
¯
“AreapCap
n´1py,?nN `?nδ,?nP qq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq
ďAreapS
n´1py,?nN `?nδqq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq
“
ˆ
N
P
˙pn´1q{2 ˜
1`
c
δ
N
¸n´1
“2´n´12
´
logp PN q`2 log
´
1`
?
δ
N
¯¯
ďc12´n
´
1
2 log
P
N`2
?
δ
N
¯
“c12´np 12 log PN` 2 q,
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Fig. 30: Maximal intersection of the decoding ball with the sphere Sn´1p0,?nP q.
where c1 –
b
P
N . In the last step, we have used the fact that δ “ N2{8. Now consider the left-hand side of (C.2).
P
´
|Capn´1py,?nN `?nδ,?nP q X C| ą L
¯
“
2nRÿ
i“L`1
ˆ
2nR
i
˙
pip1´ pq2nR´i
ď2nR
ˆ
2nR
L` 1
˙
pL`1 (C.3)
ď2nR
ˆ
2nRe
L` 1
˙L`1 ´
c2´n
1
2 log
P
N` n2
¯L`1
“c22nR`npL`1qpR´ 12 log PN` 2 q
“c22´npL`1q{2`nR, (C.4)
where c2 –
´
ec1
L`1
¯L`1
. Since we are interested in constant list-sizes, c2 does not depend on n.
Define Y to be an optimal covering of Shnp0,?nP ˘?nNq by balls of radius ?nδ. In other words, Y is a finite set of
points in Shnp0,?nP ˘ ?nNq such that miny1PY }y ´ y1} ď
?
nδ for all y P Shnp0,?nP ˘ ?nNq. In addition, Y is the
smallest (in cardinality) over all possible coverings. One can achieve (for e.g., using lattice codes [33, Chapter 2])
|Y| ď
˜
VolpBnp0,?nP `?nN `?nδqq
VolpBnp0,?nδqq
¸1`op1q
“
˜?
P `?N `?δ?
δ
¸np1`op1qq
—
´c3

¯n
. (C.5)
We now have everything to prove Lemma C.1.
P
´
Dy P Shnp0,?nP ˘?nNq, |Capn´1py,?nN,?nP q X C| ą L
¯
ďP
´
DyQ P Y, |Capn´1pz,
?
nN `?nδ,?nP q X C| ą L
¯
ď
ÿ
yQPY
P
´
|Capn´1pz,?nN `?nδ,?nP q X C| ą L
¯
Now using (C.5) and (C.4), we have
P
´
Dy P Shnp0,?nP ˘?nNq, |Capn´1py,?nN,?nP q X C| ą L
¯
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ďc22´npL`1q{2`nR
´c3

¯n
“2´Ωpnq
as long as
pL` 1q{2´R´ log
´c3

¯
ą 0
or equivalently, L ą c 1 log 1 for a suitable constant c. This completes the proof of Lemma C.1.
B. Converse.
Now we turn to the converse part of the list-decoding capacity theorem over quadratically constrained channels.
Lemma C.6. If R ą 12 log PN , then no sequence of codebooks of rate R is pP,N, nOp1qq-list-decodable.
Proof. We will show that for any code C of rate R “ 12 log PN `  with 2nR codewords (not necessarily randomly) cho-
sen from Sn´1p0,?nP q, there must some y with list-size exceeding Op1{q. Let’s choose y uniformly at random on
Sn´1p0,anpP ´Nqq. As we saw, such y’s result in the largest list-decoding regions. Define
p– P
´
x P Capn´1py,?nN,?nP q
¯
“ P
´
y P Capn´1px,?nN,?nP q
¯
.
First notice that p can be lower bounded by
p ě VolpB
n´1p0,?nNqq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq
“ 1
2
?
pi
ˆ?
2?
n
`Opn´3{2q
˙ˆ
N
P
˙pn´1q{2
“cn
ˆ
N
P
˙n{2
“cn2´n 12 log PN ,
where cn – 12?pi
´?
2?
n
`Opn´3{2q
¯b
P
N . The expected number of codewords in the intersection is
Ep|Capn´1py,
?
nN,
?
nP q X C|q “ p2nR ě cn2npR´ 12 log PN q “ cn2n.
Hence there must exist some y in Sn´1p0,anpP ´Nqq such that
|Capn´1py,?nN,?nP q X C| ě E
y„UpSn´1p0,
?
npP´Nqqq
p|Capn´1py,?nN,?nP q X C|q ě cn2n.
By a black-box reduction from ball codes to spherical codes [18], this converse holds for any code satisfying Alice’s power
constraint.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF CLAIM VIII.4
We want to prove that the scale-and-babble attack instantiates a channel whose capacity is equal to that of an equivalent
AWGN channel.
We begin with the following observation, which follows from a simple application of the chain rule of mutual information.
Lemma D.1. Consider any joint distribution px,y on px,yq such that x has differential entropy which grows as 2opnq. Let ξ
be a t0, 1u-valued random variable (possibly depending on x,y) that takes value 0 with probability 2´cn for some constant
c ą 0. Then, Ipx; yq P Ipx; y|ξ “ 1qp1´ 2´cnq ` 2´cnp1´op1qq.
Proof. The claim follows from straightforward computation.
Ipx; yq “Ppξ “ 1qIpx; y|ξ “ 1q ` Ppξ “ 0qIpx; y|ξ “ 0q
“p1´ 2´cnqIpx; y|ξ “ 1q ` 2´cnpHpx|ξ “ 0q ´Hpx|y, ξ “ 0qq
“p1´ 2´cnqIpx; y|ξ “ 1q ` 2´cnOpHpxqq
“p1´ 2´cnqIpx; y|ξ “ 1q ` 2´cnp1´op1qq.
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Let ry – p1 ´ αqx ` rg, rg – g ´ αsz . The channel from x to ry is a standard AWGN channel with capacity (VIII.5). Let
ξ “ β , i.e., the indicator random variable if James’ power constraint is satisfied. Clearly, Ipx; ry|β “ 1q “ Ipx; y|β “ 1q.
Lemma D.2.
Ppβ ‰ 1q “ 2´Ωpnq.
Proof. Recall that
g ´ αsz „ N p0, pγ2 ` α2σ2qInq “ N p0, pN ´ α2P ´ pN ´ α2pP ` σ2qqqInq— N p0, pN ´ α2P ´ 1qInq.
Now we can bound the probability
Ppβ ‰ 1q “Pp} ´ αz` g}2 ą
?
nNq
“Ppα2}x}22 ` }g ´ αsz}22 ´ 2xαx,g ´ αszy ą nNq
ďPp}g ´ αsz}22 ´ 2xαx,g ´ αszy ą npN ´ α2P qq
“Pp}g ´ αsz}22 ´ 2xαx,g ´ αszy ą npN ´ α2P q, 2|xαx,g ´ αszy| ą n1{2q
` Pp}g ´ αsz}22 ´ 2xαx,g ´ αszy ą npN ´ α2P q, 2|xαx,g ´ αszy| ď n1{2q
ďPp|xαx,g ´ αszy| ą n1{4q (D.3)
` Pp}g ´ αsz}22 ą npN ´ α2P ´ 1{2qq. (D.4)
We bound terms D.3 and D.4 separately.
D.3 “Pp|N p0, α2}x}22pN ´ α2P ´ 1qq| ą n1{4q
ď2 exp
ˆ
´ pn
1{4q2
2α2}x}22pN ´ α2P ´ 1q
˙
ď2 exp
ˆ
´ 
12
32α2P pN ´ α2P ´ 1qn
˙
—2´g1p
1qn,
and
D.4 “Pp}N p0, pN ´ α2P ´ 1qInq}22 ą npN ´ α2P ´ 1{2qq
ď exp
ˆ"
´ 
1{2
N ´ α2P ´ 1 ` ln
ˆ
1` 
1{2
N ´ α2P ´ 1
˙*
n
2
˙
ď exp
˜
´1
4
ˆ
1{2
N ´ α2P ´ 1
˙2
n
2
¸
“ exp
ˆ
´ 
12
32pN ´ α2P ´ 1q2n
˙
—2´g2p
1qn.
Using Lemmas D.1 and D.2, we have that
Ipx; yq “Ipx; y|β “ 1qp1´ 2´Ωpnqq ` 2´Ωpnq
“Ipx; ry|β “ 1qp1´ 2´Ωpnqq ` 2´Ωpnq
“Ipx; ryqp1` op1qq.
Here we have used the fact that x is power constrained, and hence has differential entropy Θpnq.
The rest of the proof follows along the same lines as the standard converse for the AWGN channel [34, Sec. 9.2]. Let us
briefly outline the steps involved.
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As a first step, note that Fano’s inequality still holds even in the presence of common randomness. Let k denote the shared
secret key. Specifically, if m, pm, and Pe, respectively, denote the message chosen, Bob’s estimate of the message, and the
probability of error, then
Hpm| pm,kq ď Hpm| pmq ď HpPeq ` nRPe,
where the first step follows because conditioning reduces entropy, and the second follows from (standard) Fano’s inequality.
Now, if we demand that the probability of error be vanishingly small in n, then
nR “ Hpmq “ Hpm|kq “ Ipm; pm|kq `Hpm| pm,kq
ď Ipm; pm|kq ` opnq
ď Ipx; y|kq ` opnq
ď Ipx; ry|kqp1` op1qq ` opnq
ď 1
2
log
ˆ
1` p1´ αq
2P
α2σ2 ` γ2
˙
n. (D.5)
We have skipped a number of arguments in obtaining the last step, but these follow from the standard converse proof for the
AWGN channel. The only property of the codebook used there is that it satisfies an average power constraint (which is indeed
satisfied as we have a more restrictive max power constraint). This completes the proof of Claim VIII.4.
APPENDIX E
QUASI-UNIFORMITY – PROOF OF LEMMAS XI.27
Define |xO1|– ?nrstr. By the construction of the strip,
|x´O1´ |– ?nr´ –
a
nrstrp1´ τq, |x`O1` |– ?nr` –
a
nrstrp1` τq.
Then the quasi-uniformity factor can be computed as follows˜
sup
xPStrn´1pO1´ ,O1` ,?nr´,?nr`q
px|zpx|zq
¸N˜
inf
xPStrn´1pO1´ ,O1` ,?nr´,?nr`q
px|zpx|zq
¸
“px|zpx
´|zq
px|zpx`|zq
“px,zpx
´, zq
px,zpx`, zq
“pz|xpz|x
´qpxpx´q
pz|xpz|x`qpxpx`q
“pz|xpz|x
´q
pz|xpz|x`q
“ exp
ˆ}z ´ x`}22 ´ }z ´ x´}22
2σ2
˙
“ exp
˜
}z}2p
a
npP ´ r´q ´
a
npP ´ r`qq
σ2
¸
(E.1)
“ exp
˜
}z}2
σ2
2nrstrτa
npP ´ r´q `
a
npP ´ r`q
¸
,
where Eqn. E.1 holds since
}z ´ x˘}22 “ nr˘ ` p}z}2 ´
a
nP ´ nr˘q2 “ }z}22 ` nP ´ 2}z}2
a
nP ´ nr˘.
APPENDIX F
EXPONENTIALLY MANY CODEWORDS IN THE STRIP – PROOF OF LEMMA XI.27
The expected number of codewords in a strip can be estimated as follows.
E
` |Strn´1pO1´ , O1` ,?nr´,?nr`q X C|ˇˇ Ecatyp˘
ěAreapCap
n´1pO1` ,?nr`,
?
nP qq ´AreapCapn´1pO1´ ,?nr´,
?
nP qq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq 2
nRcode∆pτq´1
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ěVolpB
n´1pO1` ,?nr`qq ´AreapSn´1pO1´ ,?nr´qq
AreapSn´1p0,?nP qq 2
nRcode∆pτq´1
—
„
1?
n´ 1
´r`
P
¯pn´1q{2 ´ ´r´
P
¯pn´1q{2
2nRcode∆pτq´1 (F.1)
“
„
n´1{2
´rstr
P
p1` τq
¯pn´1q{2 ´ ´rstr
P
p1´ τq
¯pn´1q{2
2nRcode∆pτq´1
“
´
2pn´1qp 12 logp rstrP q` 12 logp1`τqq´ 12 logn ´ 2pn´1qp 12 logp rstrP q` 12 logp1´τqq
¯
2nRcode∆pτq´1
“
c
P
rstr
2´n
1
2 logp Prstr q
´
2pn´1q
1
2 logp1`τq´ 12 logn ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
¯
2nRcode∆pτq´1
ď
d
pP ` σ2qp1` q
σ2p1´ q 2
´n 12 log
ˆ
pP`σ2qp1´q
σ2p1`q
˙ ´
2pn´1q
1
2 logp1`τq´ 12 logn ´ 2pn´1q 12 logp1´τq
¯
2nRcode∆pτq´1, (F.2)
where Eqn. F.1 follows from the fact that
VolpBnp0, 1qq — 1?
pin
ˆ
2pie
n
˙n{2
, AreapSn´1p0, 1qq —
c
n
pi
ˆ
2pie
n
˙n{2
.
Eqn. F.2 follows from Eqn. XI.26. The factor in the parentheses is a polynomial in n if we properly set τ “ Opplog nq{nq. If
the code operates at a rate slightly above the threshold with a sufficient yet tiny slack, then, in expectation, there are at least
24n codewords in every strip.
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